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rhe pu~pose ofth15 thesIs i, to demonstrate m prmclpk. that In.: Earh r::mfy 
"[ rt~.ileJ Lc\"el Model (EETLM) has potentlal for filture u,c ~, a th<:ater combat model 
[TTl lI,115 a three! de~cendant o1'lhe FutUle Theater Le\eJ Model (FTLM) 
Lic,c!uped under the dJrcCllon of the JOint ~taIT(J-~;' the Comcrillonal hm:.:e, Anai)sls 
DlreCl('Jatej and th~ L S Arm\" Tralnmg and l)oc\Jme Command (]'R·\DOCJ A 
~InCha,tlL ~lLe detCJJlllniSTiC model, [I:Tl v1 focuses on the lomt dspecI ofthealer cornha~ 
opclations "Jth particular emphasis on the effect that the ellrl) entry ofNa,aJ and 
\lantllne PreposlIlomng Ship, (rvrPS) hdS on the outcome of a Korth Kor,;an :\1RC 
~ceTlano EETLlI,.1 utIlIzes Bavesi~n update procedures to lITutate a level ofunctrtamty 
that l!, chdlilCteliLed by the "fog ofv.ar" and IS commonplace m modem milttary 
upr.:rallon~ 
lltillzing a notional order of battle for both Blue and Red forces (gJOund, air and 
rld\dl), multiple scenario runs were performed uIIllLmg three po~~iblc courses of action lor 
hoth R.ed and Blue. and three pmentlal entry cases for Blue entry priOl to the outbreal of 
h()~tllitle~. entIj anet the outbreak ofhllStllitit~, and entry at the time ofhosttlitlcs 
I ;(IIILtng a varlet". of measures of effectiveness. EETLM demonstrated that It doe_ mdeed 
pntentlal for ll.nure usc: Irt theater campaign analYSIS dnd plannlrt~ once It has reached 
de"cluptn('ntalmatunt; 





TABLE OF COl'HP'HS 
II THJ,"\ i".LD [·OR A ~"E\\, MODEL 
A r\"E W WORLD ORDER 
FROMTHE~'~ 
C Ef.TLJ\l 
III EETL \1 
A OVER \"IE\\ 
B "\'ETWORK DCSCRlPTlON 
I Sea-Land !\et'Nork 
a Pilyslcal~odes 
b Transll~odes 
( f'1~RCEPTJON I1'DATE CYCLE 
D DHECTIO'<S IN EETL \1 











f- PER('EI'TIO'\ OF U\11 CO\'fBAl POWER ANn c' CAP/ilifLI ITES __ 
(, Pf:RCEI'TION (IF COURSES OF A('TI01\S «(,O'\S) 
H APPUC t\BILlTY 
1\ \lODIFlC.ATIU,\ OF EETLM 
A Tl-IE PRIOR EXlSHNG MODEL 
B AOO!TlO0. Of l'.AVAL FORCES 
I Dille Forces 
;:' Red Force~ 
r ADDI rlON.AJ MODIFIC A I JOi\5 
I Pn\Sl<.:dl and TransIt Nodes 
1 Naval Sllrface-to-Sllrface engagements 
4 Stnkc Operations 
'i SI-llpboard .A,Jr Operat1on~ 
I:.mbarked Mannes 
Dvnami<.: Scheduhng of Shtp Movements 
8 Battle Damage Asqessmern 






1 OvcrYlev, of Courses Of Acllon ((,OAs) 
a Ground COAs 
b !\avdlCOAs 
d Blue's Percepllon ofReQ CO·\, 












D MO[ -\..\,\LYSIS )·1 
1 :::.ele<:tlOnofMOEs 
, \101-: I 55 
b MO£2 5b 
c MOE3 \7 
d ~'10E 4 ~7 
I r-.l0E ') 
" 
Re~llih 58 
, 1\10£ I 59 
b MOE2 6' 
c MOt] 60 
d r>AOE4 72 
\10E 5 75 
f Overall MOE Conclusions 7() 




FLITURE ADDITIONS TO EETLM 
1 Mll1e\Varfare 77 
Antl·Suhm,mneWarfare n 
TileateI Ballistic !l..llss11e Defense 80 
, \\'e:lron~ of\1ass De~tructlOn 81 
, Rules of Engagemem 
" 
" 
DVfldntlC A1r Taskmg Order Generation 
Na\(\llactlcaIManeuver R1 
8 8attle Damage A~'iessmeTll SJ 
( I HES1,; CONCLUSIO:\S 
" 
APPE]\DIX A ]\'OOE ('HARA.CTERISTICS 
'\Pf'E'\DIX H HI LIE NAVA.l. CO\1BArAN~1 OA.1'A 
A.Pf'p...-orX( RED NA.VA.L CO\1BATANT DATA 
A.PPE''''-DLX 0 EETUvl 0\:1'P111 FORMATS 
A.PPF,\T.lIX E EETLM OCTPCT DATA 
LIST or RCFERENCES 









Lnder the dilectJOn 0:' 1-8, the Conventional Forcc~ An<lIYSI, Dlrectoratl: «("FAD) 
of the Jomt Stafe ~nd m conjunCllOn with the 1I S Annv Trammg and Doctnne Command 
(TRA.DOC) professors and stud~nts at the I"aval Postgraduate School (;-"'PS) de\eloped 
Ine future I'heakl Level Model (FTLM) FTL~1 is a stochastic theater le'vel wmhat 
flwdel that utilIze, Ravcslan probabliH\ updates m an attempllO capture the mherent 
U:KenaIllIIC, ofmoJem war Usels offTL\l call define levels of sen SOl lIlaCCUlaCles 
mdlvldl:al Llnlts profll;lency le\els IT] teullS of C3 and lIltelilgence gathenng <lod can alrer 
the ahlll!\' ofa commilnder to dlssemmate infolmatlOn to hIS suhordlllate umts (or 
cOllver~("ly, to fll~e data delivered from hl~ subordinat<;;s) Though de\elopmentall) 
Immature FTLM \\a~ the first ~tep to\\ards modeling theater combat uSing a non-
d,~tcrmlT\l<;tlc analY'iis tool 
L'smg the fTU\l ,(fchl\ccture, se\eral variants of the model can Ie Into bemg Each 
()flhesc valiants f0cu5ed on diffenng aspeo:;ts of modern [ont1](1 such as peacekeeping 
miSSIOns Operu\lon, Other Than WaX (OOTW). and ~rnall umt engdgemems 
i\ddl:lon<lll~. It "a, recogruzed thi!: the Lmled States 'WIll not parllC1pate m a future 
Ui;i(l!ct utll!zmg asset, from il ~mgle military servIce Joint operations, while always 
hendiclallrl the pas!. ale no\\ a necessity due to the extreme drawdown m the ~izc ofth", 
Armed C;crvlce~ m the posI-Cold War era Accordingly, stu(knts and faculty at !'-JPS 
developed a J01m version of the model called the Early Entry Theater Level Model 
,[t 111\1) A, the name Implie<" EETLM focu~es on theater combat beginrung with pre-
11C'~lillt\ reqUlrcment, such ,IS prolcctmg power Via naval Carrier Battle Group~ (C\"HGSj 
<Wei AlTlpfllL)jou~ Task Groups (ATGsl protectmg and convoymg U S Army Maritime 
PrerU'I~lonmg Ships (l\1PS I, and the execution of amphlblOu~ operatlon~ to effect a forced 
el1tT""\ Into the lhealer d' needed (Il!] thl' theSIS. the North Koredfl )'lRC s;:;enano 'W,i'. 
"elected I Inpu1s rq~ardlllg the Ch"fi!cten~tlCS ofE[TL~l \Vere received fiolTI J \\Idc-
qm"\\ of ,uch a, the I S !\a\il.1 War College, U S !\]r Force Inslitute of 
Tecllr.(Jlclgv <I:ld L S Alm\ TRl,DOC It 1(, of notE' that the f.arlv Entrv Theat~r \.~vd 
frclm the gr()und ur,,'0 a)(llnt cOlllbd[ model .mJ 
~...I~ het:n llidde In captUlC' the unlljL:C' ~haractenstlcs ot the dlll'elenl ~elVlce, when 
ce~lglll1lg thl" EE-! L'vl algOllthms 
dllClnpr 
'\d\al force., to be used ll\ EETLM represent the notIOnal force; expected Ii' be 
availJ.i)le to the United States ll\ the near future. I c, N1Ml rz CVN s SPRU,\NCF DD " 
~nd \\ ASP LHD s The makeup of the Red ndval force~, hOVvber, does not retlecl tho: 
pOVver oflhe I\;onh Korean '!\Jav) lns[ead, two SAG'~ have been created ~() a~ 10 
leSt Ef:. TL "-1 's ability 10 coumer a large SOviet style naval force and to engage a ~maller 
nlls~lk bOill threat \\ hlle not accurately depICting the thre'll posed by the Nonh Korean 
:-"i\\,. It IS believed that the Red forces involved til thIs scenario more vlg()fousiv te~l 
EETLM'~ detection and eng'lgemellt algunthms Data for all the combatants were taken 
frol11 lIncbssified publication~, and their inclusion In thls thesis does nol con~tltule an 
endor~ement by the l~mted States government 
Smce the aim of this thesis Isto dctcrnllne If the tlmt: ufamval of nay alforces(to 
IllCludc A1111\ /l,.1PS) impacts the outcume of the overall campaIgn, EtTL,\l data runs wele 
cla~sltled based on two charactensncs the Course of Acnon (COA) that Red was 
jJurqumg, and the time of am val of the naval fOlce~ Three eOAs wele defined for both 
~Ide~ tn the seenano, but only Red's COA was pre-determmed Blue forces dynamicalh 
selected their eOA. ba~ed un then perception of what COA Red wa~ pursuing For cach 
of the three Red COAs Blue had a corresponding eOA avaliable With whICh to defend the 
Korean Peninoul<l ,A.dditlonally, there were three entf) optlons available to Blue naval 
krces two days prior to the outbreak ofhosl1htlb (Case 1), two days aileT the outbreak 
ot hostilities (Case:n, or arnve at the outbreak ofhostlhtie~ (Case 3) The selectIOn of 
entr,' opliun~ was pre-deteflllIncd by the analyst, and is not a dynamically selected optIOn 
lTl'.hecufTentmodel 
In conductlflg the analysis of EETLM, two areas \.\ here con~ldered First, a 
graphical anal"Sls of the eOA's wa~ conducted in order to ascertalll if the variatIon m 
entry case options Blue selected would a/Teet the abiltty of Red to ascertam Blut:'s 
Intended COA. dnd conversely IfBlu<,'s entry case optIOn would afkct Blue's abilltv to 
determme Red'~ lfltended eOA "! hiS Jnal\'sl~ concluded that Blue', entn.' case I 0: 3 
(I;arl" ur Oil-time ,IHI',al ot naval and )\11'S fOlce~) product:d the n10~1 desirablt: ~Iluatlun 
fur the Rluc cOffilllandel 
~econd. an analYSIS of the effce! that the time ofar~l\al ofn~\al forces h:J.d un the 
outCl'ml" ofth..: cuntllCt based on five Mea<;lIre~ of Eflec(lveness (MOl's) that replcsen' 
the survival rate of the naval and gruund forct!s Rased on thlS analYSIS. It \\a~ delefTnmed 
lhal Rlue entn.' case I wa~ the most de~lrable option for the Blue thedter commander In 
bc1th anal,.ses, the decI~IOli regardmg which Rlue entf; case to pUisue VvJ~ not as clear as 
\.vould he lnIUltlvely expected TIlls lack of a clear-cut option In:!)' be a result ofEE 11 M's 
IlnmdlUrily d, d (.:ombat model, or It may slmply reflect the fact that clear cut decisions 
flequentiy do not exist m theater le'vel combat 

I. l~TRODllCTlOI\ 
The purpose ofthl~ thC~I~ I, to demonstrale 1n pllnClple that the Earl: Emr',' 
Themel Le\el \.lodcl ([FTLM; can adC'lUdtcl) rC[lre~cnt the hlriou~ facets ofI01n! 
thCdter le\el v..arfare Addltlonall), thl~ them will demonstrate that the output ofEETLM 
c'.11l pro'due the user v,ab B set of dmJ from which analySIS can be pcrformed Bnd 
Inrefenl"e~ regBrctulg theatci level rl<ill~ can be drawn The pOint will bc made throughout 
tl~b lhcsl~ lhal EETLI\1 (an offshoot of the future Theater Level :Ylodel (FTLM)) I~ In its 
de\clapmcntal stage, dnd certdlll a~pects of its modelmg capalnht} need to b" refined 
bc:forc It IS acccpteu as an andly~l~ tool \\'here appropnate, thesc aspccts will be 
dl~cu"sed and recommcndatlOns regarding corrcctlOns of these shonconl1ng~ wdl be 
otkn:u 
B. FOAAIAT 
TIIl~ the.';ls conSIsts of six chapter~ and fhe appendlGcs v.lth the Intent of gIVing th(, 
r('adel a thorough understandmg ofEl:. TL:-'1. with part)culal' emphasl~ on the changes 
m<J.fle to the FTL\1 archlte.;turc In order to make EETLM a Indy }omt model The 
cie,elopment of tETl ',,1 wa~ conducted a~ a .I0mt undertaklllg v.ith CPT Greg BroUlliett(C 
L'SA emphaslzmg the mOdlficBtions to lhe ground combat capablhtle~ of the model 
\\ hile the v.ork presented 1Il t!us thesIs is onglilal se".eralleferenee~ to CPT Rrolliliette's 
lhl',l\ afC made thlOUghoUl this thesIs 
Chapter II proVIdes the reader \\Ilh thc rallon,ik b('hilld the archllectulc of 
rrl Ud It lbseu~ses the chflngmg world threat<, flnd the /I"" "mph,i~I' on littoral v..alfare 
d.IlJ I\L!,Uf Regillnal COlltln!-!enCles tl\lRCs) It also pOlTIb out tlw nev. direction that L S 
iTlilltill) doctnne I~ tJkmg, and that ,ill ~cr'':l<':(,~ arc recogTIlzlllg that the resource, slillph 
do lIot exist for Jny one serVIl:e to plan on flghtmg a cantlret without signIficant 
]1.!rll';l[ldll(ln iron, all othel 11 alsu gl\!es a bllefllltrociuCLlon tD the Eali\, ElIlfV 
I heate! L~vel vlod.:1 and rrll\ ldes a hst ofpotcntiai !,~ue~ that could be mvesligated bv 
EETu,.l 
Chapter III pl0vldes an m-depth explanation ofthe mathematKal underpmll1ng~ of 
E[TLM's prinCIpal tCatures De!ectlOn algorithms are de~~nbed, ,i~ are the pro!,;es~es 
fFI LM u~es 10 calculate the perceptlom of both the fnendl) and enem, forces The 
pel ~ept1ons dIscussed u1Clude both the percelvo:d order of ban Ie for the force~, and the 
Caul se~ of AClion I e~A's) each side "thllJks" the other side will pursue I::.~tlmated le\eb 
of combat ptw,er and CJ capabilny. and how these values arc deterrmned. arc abo 
dIscussed lhls chapter IS based on prevlOu~ work done on FILl\i and the reader will be 
rden eo to the appropllate SOUl ce~ should more mformatlOn be deSired 
1 he modifications made to the ongmal FILM architecture are discussed in 
Chartel 1\ The allent of these modlricatmm are to mdke EETLM aJomt model trom Ih 
InllIal de\ elopmelll Man} combat models pUlVOn to be "Jomt" m that they can make an 
alli'leid float and call 1t an aircraft camero or they model Arm)' and AIr force opt:ratiOn~ 
with the underlvlTIg m,sumptlOn that Naval forces arc to be engaged In other thedters 
The.o;e methodlJlogle~ arc unsalisfaC10r;, m today's 'War fighting envrronment From the 
besHlnmg oflh!.'; the~b, rt ild., be~n the mtent ofal1m\olved to create [LTL:Vl a~ a truly 
Jomt model - meaning that input~ and reqUlremenb from all services would be sollclted 
MId lflcorpmated Al the lime of this writing th" evolutlon ot'EEILM has been gUided b;-
th~ reqlllrements dnd recommendatIons of the followmg agencle~ 
• Conventional Forces AnalysIs DueclOrate, 18" 10m! ClneE. of Staff 
• "'>,rmy Tralnlll.tl and Doctrlne Command, Fon Monroe \'lIgnua 
• L :., i\rmy Early Entry, Lcthallly and SurVI\"abll!l\ Uatlle Lab 
I-UJI Munroe \Irglflld 
• 1'<aval War College, !\ewpon, Rhode Island 
• l\aval Doctrlne Command, -"onvlk \"lrgmla 
• Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 
• Naval Amphibious Warfare School, Little Creek.. Virginia 
• Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright Patterson AFB, Dayton, Ohio 
It is acknowledged that no model can be all things to all agencies, but it has been a priority 
in the development of this model to incorporate as many ofthe received inputs as possible 
Where appropriate, requirements that have not yet been incorporated will be 
discussed. It is considered a unique feature ofEETLM that it has been developed from its 
inception with particular attention paid to the joint aspects of warfare in which the United 
States will be engaging for the foreseeable future 
Chapter V contains an analysis of a North Korean MRC scenario. This analysis is 
conducted utilizing three replications of the scenario under various combinations of Blue 
naval entry times and Red courses of actions (the methodology for the analysis is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter V). It is important to note that due to the 
developmental immaturity of the model and the possible inconsistencies in its algorittuns, 
this analysis does not represent a stringent statistical study ofEETLM. Rather, it is 
mtended to demonstrate in principle that the output provided by EETLM is amenable to 
statistical analysis. Graphical and comparative analysis will be performed on the models 
output data in an attempt to demonstrate EETLMs potential for use by a theater staff 
analyst 
Finally. Chapter VI details future research and development areas that need to be 
addressed in order to make EETLM an operational analysis tool. Many of the insights for 
Ihls chapter have been gained from the inputs ofthe agencies listed above. and some have 
been draw from the aspects of theater warfare that were not able to be incorporated into 
the current model due to constraints oftime, computer capability, etc. Also included in 
this chapter are the conclusions drawn from this thesis and comments regarding the 
applicability ofEETLM to future military strategic plaMing 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
The design and analysis ofEETLM rest upon certain key assumptions. First and 
foremost ofthese assumptions is the validity of the incorporated algorithms. While every 
attempt has been made to ensure that the algorithms in EETLM accurately represent the 
processes they purpon to model, many of the algorithms can only be considered to 
possess face validity at this time. Comments regarding the strengths and shoncomings of 
EETLM's algorithms will be made throughout this thesis as appropriate 
Additionally, there have been several assumptions made regarding the North 
Korean MRC scenario selected for this study. Most of these are discussed in later 
chapters, but the key assumptions are 
• Only two aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG's) and Amphibious Ready 
Groups (ARG's) will be allocated to the theater. In reality it is likely that this 
number will be much greater. The number of these units were limited to minimize 
the computational complexity required for the model runs. 
• No submarine activity. The capability to model Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
does not yet exist in EETLM 
• No mine laying operations exist. The presence of mines is a realistic expectation 
in a littoral warfare scenario, but the capacity to model mine warfare is not yet 
incorporated in the current version ofEETLM. This function is planned for more 
mature variants of the model 
• Weapons of Mass Destruction are not utilized While this aspect of warfare 
definitely needs consideration in the theater planning process, inclusion in this 
version ofEETLM has not occurred. Adding this facet of strategic warfare is 
recommended for future applications 
• The pIlmary md!cator oful1pendmg hosnllt1e~ I, the stockpiling ofloglstic:al 
units al the Oe~MlhtanLed Zone (0'\1Z) Under til(' dS~llmpllon that the :\orth 
f\.l)redn, would attempt to <;tockpile ~lll1icleIll log!stlcal support at the 0.\17. for" 
rrotrattet.! ground campaign this late offorwald stagmg \.\us chaser. as the 
Inalcatol oran attack Detdils on the alf<onthm us"d by f'r:"J 11\1 for detcrmllllng 
the pelcel\ed attack tllnC ha~ed on IU£l~!lc,,1 movement rate wdl be discussed 
brief],.· llliater chapters Derailed de5cnpnon ofthl~ algonthm can bc found m 
Rcierence [()] 
\\'hlic tnere are several assumptions regardmg both EETL\1 and the North Korean 
scenariO, the vahdlt\ ofth(; modell~ sull eon~ideled ~umt:lent to demonstrate 1Il pnnclple 
tht" abilliv of the mOdel [0 represent lomt theater level warfare Unce this proof of 
]lIIllCiple IS demonstrated. more ~tnngl:nt validation of the model can be accomplished 
upon complcnon ofthb vahdatlon process, illS expected that EEll.M could be 
dlstnbuted tu thedter staflsand utlhzeLi effectIVely as a toul for planning and analyzlllg 
(;ontmgenc\, pldfl', rut tulure confltCb 

II. THE NEED FOR A NEW MODEL 
A. A NEW WORLD ORDER 
With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline of America's defense 
budget, the philosophy behind U S. war fighting has undergone a dramatic, perhaps 
unprecedented, period of revision. New ways of maximizing U.S military effectiveness 
and alternative ways of capitalizing on the combined force of employing elements of aU 
services have been studied. The renewed interest in joint operations is due partly to the 
realization that the United States will be called upon to "do more with less", but also due 
in large part to the appreciation that senior commanders have for the synergistic effect 
produced by joint operations. The successful experiences from Operation Desert Stonn 
are testimony to the fact that no single service can operate in a vacuum, and no realistic 
strategtc planning can ignore the inclusion of elements from each service in combat 
planning 
Another fact oflife in the "New World Order" is that the conflicts in which the 
United States will most likely engage will not be Superpower vs Superpower conflicts on 
a global scale, but rather regional conflicts. Examples of these types of conflicts abound; 
Desert ShieldlDesen Storm, Somalia, and Bosnia are simply a few. North Korea. is 
another theater where joint strategic planning has a high priority 
For these reasons, and a host of others that are beyond the scope of this thesis, 
there is a definitive need for a combat model that truly reflects the joint nature offuture 
COnflicts and is not restricted to the outdated idea of NATO vs Warsaw Pact global 
conflict 
8. • •• FROM THE SEA 
To meet the new challenges offuture conflicts, the Armed Services have revised 
their basic operational doctrine. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps have issued a 
joint white paper titled " ... From The Sea. ~ [Ref I] that lays out the new direction .the 
naval services are to take. placing a renewed focus on littoral warfare and the projection of 
power ashore. The U.S. Army has published its vision of the future in the form ofFM-
100-5. Operations [Ref. 2] This manual places its emphasis on non-linear battle. speed 
and multi-dimensional attacks in order to confuse., demoralize., and destroy the enemy 
One of the key facets of these new doctrinal concepts is the acknowledgment that 
the U.S. cannot assume forces will be in the area when conflicts begin. Forced entry, early 
entry, and force sustainability prior to and during the commencement of hostilities must be 
of primary concern to strategic planners. Therefore, it is imperative that a combat model 
exists which combines both the uncertainty of modem conflict and the importance of early 
arrival and the sustained projection of power in modem military conflict. 
These new doctrinal concepts, and the subsequent tactics that will be developed 
from them, are not adequately modeled by existing theater level models. Current models 
eaher have no significant joint modeling aspect, or are so inflexible due to their size and 
support requirements that they are unable to be easily modified for new doctrine or 
strategy changes A need exists for a truly joint theater level model that is flexible enough 
to test new doctrinal concepts, yet is portable and user friendly enough to prevent it from 
becommg the sole domain of a single analysis agency 
C. EETL'I 
The Eall\' EIltI\ rheater level r>.1odei (EETL \0 l~ a thedler kvel sto<.:hast\( 
comhdt model that ta"es Into Jccount the Issue~ ral~ed lfl thc prcviou~ sectIOns Detailed 
dhCll~,\()n of ho'" EETLM operate, I~ reserved for Chapter III of this thesIs HoweveI 
,I,lthtilelflteg:ratlonofna\di [orceSdTld cdpabliltleSJlIlO the eXlsung mudel (whl<.:h IS Itself 
III I~~ de,elopmcntdi mranl:y) cFTLM ~vlil be one of few combat model~ developed as a 
nuh lomt model TIlt" comhll1ed effel'(, ()fmter-~ervice cumbat can therefore be modeled, 
Jomt strategle, e'plmeu, and r>.leasules of 1:.ffec!lveness (\'iOE's) selected to ~tatlstJcall\ 
Jnalv7ethedeslrabiIJt;.ofthesenev.docmnc\ 
EI-~-I L,\l cunentlv operates USing a C.J..+ uperating -:ode, and reqUires a -186 
pro(e~,of,.j h1B of RAM, and MI~rosoft \\'mdow~ to run Vananb ofEFI'LM may 
rcqulft' the use ofa more powerti.J1 computmg platform, dependmg 011 the SIze and 
C'oIllpic'\lt) of the ~L.en<m() iJemg run The use ofa \\iindov.s based PC model ha~ the 
follcmmglflllnediatebellefits 
• -1 he Illodel becomes more "u~er-fnendly" smce most people are elthcr 
ahead) famIliar WIth the Wlndo,""s enVlrOnmen! or can easily learn It 
• The sue ofthc opcr,ltmg model IS small enough to allow Wide dlssemmatJon 
Tim allov.s doctnnai anJiy~is b) as many agen-:les as possible Man.Ii combat 
IT1Cldeh dlle to thell Size and suppOIt reqUlremenb, are forced to bc located with 
onl\ a ~m):le ,1fidlySIS agenvy 
The ~cendno~ run tHrough EETlM arc dra\\ll rrom t\\(\ data file" each less than 
one \1H In ~lze The actual scenario. fncndl\'enCIll\ coursc ofaC'tlOns (COA's) dnd order 
oj bJIlle (OOB) are comamed In the s~enarJo datatllc referred to as the * [\fEr file "lhc: 
,d.eduling of <.:amcr aIr ~trlkc" and fmnahawk land atlack []n"\llc {TI.AM) launches IS 
tClllporcmlv dccomplished through an ordnance file called the ~ ORO file (ttlJ~ temporary 
scheduling of dlr ~tIlJ..es and TLA '1 launches are discussed 1Il Chapter TV) fhc data In 
lhe~e file, aJe edsll\ modlficd to accountloJ changes m trlendlv1encm\ eOA. updates l!I 
Intelligence, or changes m filendlv!enem\' capabilities Thl:; re~ulb m a combat modellhJ\ 
. ., tle,]blc enough to meet the demands of changmg ""orld thredlS as \\ell as ad\ancl1lg 
technological developments In C S and enemy combat capabilltlcs 
EETUvl b ~tocha~tH: ba~ed, not delen!l1m~tlc This chalaetenstic leads to a more 
reali,lie modeling of actudl combat with allns uncenamlles The outputs of an LETLM 
,ccndnl' an: ciatd rcprcsentlnf! a range orpOlentlal outcomes sUllable fOT stallstlcal 
I he end re~u!II" a lTIodelthat allov.~ analysts and stralegy planners tu dc\clop nc\\ 
Ideas fal loml operatlOns m a given regIOnal confhct. run many replicalions of the scenario 
10 gather data on their de~ired MOE'~. and suhject the data to rigorous analvsls in order to 
rell~ble 1!ldlcatol~ of the de~lralHllt\ orthese new concepb Poren\lal questlllns rha! 
an:il\,l, iJ.nd strategic plannets can address With an mtegrated EETLM <Ire 
• WhO! II Ihl.' Impacl (!! havmga Carner HaUle (jroup ((T8(;), or multq)/c 
"II .I/U/U)/I prior /() (mnmellcemenf oj hO.llIiIllCI) 
• l!()c" Ihe P"''''''d' "I (1 (Tf)( J have some If'pe 0/ mt[l.l/lmh/e delelrenl eff.;Cl 
IIwl ,""III hc 'l"a/lUtldi (1l1dIl5r-d md<:le!mll!llJ? \jhc·l .... Ihele ,,\\eI1 wilt he 
Je,"fOl_ .... d 
.... (lal/l'elJe,,' 
1e 
AIl~wcr~ to thc~e Jnd simllar que~\lOIl~ ar(' imponJnt to ~tfalcg]C planners in 
determining ,~hat directIOn l ~ fDfce .,truClUles and deployment strdtegle~ \\ill.l<o The 
need for a combat m,)del tl' determme vahd answers for these questlon~ definlteiy eXIst 
LEl LM, v.nh the mtegldtlOn ofl\avJI and Manne camoat capabillllb, IS a viable tool fOI 




As stated in the Chapter II afthis thesis, EETLM operates stochastically in an 
effort to capture the uncertainties inherent in modem combat. These intangibles consist of 
such factors as leadership ofa unit's officers and NCOs, morale, spirit, and (more often 
than not) random luck While it is acknowledged that these facets of warfare are not able 
to be precisely quantified, it is asserted that EETLM is able to approximate these random 
factors far better than the detenninistic models currently employed 
This chapter discusses the mechanics of how EETLM stochastically represents the 
uncertainties inherent in joint combat. Readers who are not interested in the mathematical 
underpinnings ofEETLM may choose to continue on to Chapter IV Those who desire an 
even more detailed explanation of the mechanics ofEETLM are referred to an NPS thesis 
by CPT Karl Schmidt, USA (OR Dept., Sept 1993) that documents the mathematical 
foundation of the predecessor to EETLM, the Future Theater Level Model (FILM) 
[Ref 3]1 
I FTLM is the foundation upon which EETLM was built As such, many ofFTLM's 
algorithms and operatmg pnnciples are used by EETLM. Accordingly, unless other 
references are specified, this entire chapter acknowledges the description ofthe algorithms 
by CPT Schmidt ([Ref 3]) 
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B. NETWORK DESCRIPTION 
1. Sea·Land Network 
Army, Marine Corps, and Navy forces exist in a combined network that represents 
the geography of the theater and critical naval operating areas This network is comprised 
of physical and transit nodes that define both the movement corridors available to forces in 
the scenario, as well as the characteristics (such as cover and concealment, trafficability, 
etc.) governing forces operating in the theater, 
Physkal Nodes 
Movement of units in EETLM occur within networks. similar to a 
conventional arc-node network, that are composed of two key elements: physical and 
transit nodes Each of these nodes are defined in the * .NET data file and are assigned 
characteristics that govern how the forces occupying these nodes behave in the various 
phases of the scenario. A list ofthe characteristics of both physical and transit nodes are 
mcluded as Appendix A 
Physical nodes represent some key element of the scenario's geography 
Physical nodes may correspond to fixed geographical sites such as' 
• Ciues 
• TLAM launch baskets 
.. Aircraft carrier operating areas (CVOAs) 
• Highway intersections 
• Any other physical location deemed to be of strategic interest 
The physical size ofthe geographical area being represented by the node 
(I e , the size of the city or the area contained by the TLAM launch basket), is selected by 
the user in the '".NET datafile. To date. however, there is not a capability to array or 
partition forces within the physical node itself As a result oftrus limitation, a CVBG 
14 
0~';lIPi'11lg a phvsi,-al node for example docs not possess d tacHcal fOI-mallOn but mstead 
,,\.1.,1, d, d ~Illgle enlll, \\Ilh the c:ombmed combat capabllny oflt5 component ~hlps rhlS 
~e.,ul~, III an mabllll! ofEI:.TLM tu measulc the efl'ectl\eness of AAW or ASW picket 
ships In a C\TKi or to model the change ofa batIk group'~ tactical formatIOn in respon~e 
til a vercelved ~hange In thl cat aXIs or thleat type 
!-tTor1\ to ad\'e\c> thl~ level or fidelity are III r'mgre~, Current resealch IS 
1m e~ltgallTl.l;" means to partition nooe~ into a set of "~ub-node~" that would allow lor 
un. I> O,::cupVlng a node to Pos!tlun Ihemselves wnhm that node U1 respume to some 
C"-ternal cue As an example a phys!cal node representmg a C\'OA md;. be partitioned 
Into a 511b"node for the (.;arner and Its close escorts, a sub-node for outlymg AA \\ picke"l 
ships another 'llb-node I'm AS\\' \.:;reeIlmg ShlP~, and perhap~ yet another ~ub-node 
replc,entlng a rcnd~l"OU." pOint for undenvay replenl~hment operations Ifthe perception 
uflhe :\A\V threat reached a pre-defined threshold, the" AEGIS Crlilser assigned to the 
C\'H(, could move trom the close escal1 sub-node and occupy the AAW picht sub-node 
SI1l1I1J~ly. If the ASW threat reached a cenaln level of significance. the CVOG could 
appwpnately chdng~ lb defenSIVe: posture bv statlOrung Its destroyers III the ASW picket 
,utJ-roude '\5 staled preYluush eftons an: being made to lllclude tlus type of node 
pal1ltlonlng In futun: \erSlOn~ of EETLI\1 
Transit l\'odes 
TranSit node., fulfill the role of ares \I11he tradItional an'-nodenenvurk 
Ed~h tl an,lt nOck contaln~ the chaJacterlstlc~ orth~ LerrJIl\ (.;onnecttng two phYSIcal nodc'~; 
A ph\'<;ICJ~ floue can be connected bv an\ number ofrranSil node~. alioV>lIlt; fO! <I "~l) high 
It ,cO' (,1 r~\l)IUllUJ\ ofrhe Lhaiacrensllc~ orthe p!t\slcal pdth l(JIlneCIH!g t\\O geoglaphc 
Ic)lJ(k\'lS 
1< 
Consider a ~lluatlon where a ground urnt leave~ City A and IS proceedll1g to 
CIl\' B The terrmn bet,~een the (WO Cities could consist of" mountam lange nlJdwav 
bety..een the !\.o cllle,. y..lth a imuy..n mmefidd between the mountainS and Cltv A, and flat 
open !erram between the mountams and ell\, B A smglt: arlO representmg tIm terram 
would hdvt: to appl\ Wllll; typ~ of "wrage or the ver) diffelent effects of these three 
terram types as tht '·{.;05t" ofthe arc In EETLM. three transit nodes can be defined to 
.-'\ and Bone w\th the characlenstlcs of the minefield olle with those orthe 
muuntam lange~ and a third with the charaClenStiCS of open tenam As the forces move 
from CII\ A to ,-Hj B. theil mowrnent ratcs susccptlbilit .... to detectloTl by enemy ,ensors. 
will change a, the\ tranSition from these different environments 
2. Air "et\\"llrh. 
I he air network employed by EETLM consists oiagrid with eel! size selected b) 
lhe user III the ~ NET datllt"ile T!us gnd is supenmposed on the sea-land network and 
1l,CS a Imked 115: III tne uperating code to match a locatlon m the ground network to Its 
cOllcspondlng air nety..ork gnd 
\\fhen a:12raA launch fOI a ~tnkc miSSion from either an airfield or a ,flip. EE1"[.l\1 
Inti odLlce5 the l\lrclait m(n the grid thai cOJTesponds to the locatlon of the laLln.:h pOint 
The 1I1fCfJit then commencto' a tran,lt to the target site utilizing a variant of Dljkstra's 
a'gonthm that attempts tu aVOid the enemy's air defense (AD) SHes As the aircraft transit 
thrDugh vanous grid" their sl1scepllblhty to attntlon IS calculated based on the pmportlon 
(lftoe dlr gnJ that I~ wlthlll the lethalltv envelope of an AD Sltt" m the sea-land nely..ork 
The more an illf grid IS \\l1tl1r1 an all deft"nse <;I(e, envelope. the gredt"rthc ehanccth:i! 
allC!afi v .. lthltl that gnd alt' gomg to be lost to ,urface-to-alf-llllSS,le (SA\I) fire 
1(' 
i\ssumll1g the aIrcraft reach their target and deli .... er their ordinance. EtTL\1 \1/111 
~eleCl an egle~~ route fOJ the tllgm The egress route 1<; 5ekcted to a\Old the enemv's AD 
Slles and IS tvplcally not the same route used for target mgres~ Upon succt'ssful 
completiOn oflhe letliln l1lght. the aircraft "land" b) bemg tlansferred to the mrlieJd or 
shlr thdl i~ ~t;()grdphlcaIIJ correlated to the au gnd at wluch the atrcrafl\ flight ended 
'\ ll1on,: dCL!lled dl~cu~Slon ufthe an netw0,k can be lound 1TI tht; NPS masters 
the<;ls \\lltler. b) I-iua·Chung \Vang [I~tf 4J 
C. P[RCEI'TlO!'lI'PDATECYCLE 
EF.TLM's (alculal1on~ of pel ce,ved enemy actions are based on a penodlc cycle m 
WhIC!. ~tT1"0r IllfOrmatlOTl (or IJ1fmm(l.tTon from ~ome other source) i~ gathered and fused 
Into d value that represents one Side's perceptlons ofthe composition and mtended actIon., 
(l('th~ OlITer Side This Pelception Update Cycle (hereafter referred to simpl) as the Cycle) 
l'perall:~ Independent!> f01 all SIde, In the scenano conflict, and the user can sptclfy m the 
• NET data file the length Oflhese cycle~ 
Dmmg each afK cycle~, EETLM pertorms the following principal functIOns 
Deternunes rf UllltS In the scenano are detected by the opposmg forces ~ensors 
C urnpute, a pelCepllOTl of the Order of Battle fOI tho~e umts detected 
DCrI\CS an estrmate of the C3 capabIlity and combdl power of detected Ulllts 
Generates (\f update., perceptIOns regardmg the detected unit'S intended Course 
of ACllOil 
1 here arC' llDvlDush other filT1ctluno EETL'vf perl'unns during each cycle, but tht~c 
art rile I..C\ fi..nctl(,n~ Ihal 1~1, chdpler \\111 dISCIJ,~ III further del ail 
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D. DETFTTIONS I'll E£TLI\1 
Detections In EETLM are dependent upon se\craJ facton inciudmg the amount of 
Cl'\ el dnd concealment availahle. the dUlatlon oftmlc a unit is expo~ed to an opponent's 
sen~or and (to qllne an extent) random chance The vaflablc~ useJ m detennmmg 
detectlO:1S are defined as follows 
T'.J I 'Ji Transit time tOI a unit going from node 1\ I to nDlle N:2 
D!";1,'2 Tllne to detect at least one unit gomg tram node Nl to node 'i::' 
Ul\"j.K~ Numbel ofuntts tran&llmg from node NI to node t\2 
~"I 1',2 Amount of surveIllance effort expended by searcher on transit 
n(1de~ c0nnecting phYSICal nodes!'Jl and N2 ThiS "alue I~ 
obtamed from the ll~er plOvlded· "\""ET file 
R Random number drawn from an ExponentIal dl~tnbution with 
meanequalwone 
TI',l :-.12 I, it ."JDlmaII J distributed random vanable Vvith the followmg parametcrs 
11= (An.: Distance) 
(Unn Speed) 
0-' (J lOp 
(I) 
(el 
1 he dl~tance betv..een nodes and the urut speeds me values speCified III the ¥ '\ET 
Jar,l fik 
O"1,N2 IS computed a<, follow~ fRef 13 p 1] 
r-"me that 5111~C D'.JIJ<' I~ a multiplicative factor of the Exponential ran dum 
\MlaDlc R II Isan b;oonelllial random vanabled,Vveil 
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Fe I \.\10 detl:ction pmccs, G<\11 bl;' <;ummarl7cd by the following sequencc of 
A unIt leaves node :\ I for node :\2 
t nd<:r this method. It b po~siblt' for <1 unit to C\'<IUC dctectlOn even unde] 
condltlon~ f<\\mable to the searching force Con\crsely, it is possible for a umt to travc\lll 
dar kness, or through other forms of concealment, and stlll be detected by the searchmg 
force This refle;Cl\ the pmentlals faced by commanders 1Il the tield and IS a leah~tl-:: factor 
of combat 
L I'ER("EPTIOl\ OF 1'l\JT ORDER OF BATTLE (OOB) 
L'p()Jl delectlon or a unrt EETUvl wIll begm to update as percepiion oftlie 
m"k~up of the detected unrt Prior to a detectloll, EETLM maimams a default pnor 
distribution tholt sh[)w~ all possible combmallons of units on a given node to be ~qua!ly 
:Ikeh Tilb !nltlal pnor dl;tnbutwn can be alter~d by th~ L1$~r a~ desIred After detectIon, 
EETL:Yl calculate;, and maintdlTl' perceptl()n dlslnbution~ "Ith Ba)eslan updates to 
ITHegrolte Iflcomln,l! stnsor datol Into liS perceived OOB ~eforc dlSCUSSlllg the mechalllc$ 
of hOI-I- the po~tl"nllr dlstnbutlOns ar~ calculated, two "cy dcfinltJon~ must be understood 
• DOClrIJl,;..)t[£!}gtb The' stren~'1h of a unit as entered bv the user l!I th~ 
• l\ET data file 
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Glotmd truth strength is a !\ormal random van able with rarameter~ u'J and (Ji,1 
based on doctnn<: strength 'values 
Ground Truth Strength - Normal[a"o-"l 
\\here UI,; and CJI,I are the mean and ~tandarJde'viatlon lespcctIVCl)',ofthe 
doctrine strength of the Unit a~ ddined 1Tl the * '\"ET data file (i e, the number of] 
equipment types attached to wut 1 in the scenario defimtlOn file) "'\"ote that Ground 
Truth SIl-clll!th 1<; ullkno~\n to the opposmg f0rce~ 
(4) 
Ha~ed un tlll<; mfOl mallon, and on the updated sensor obSenall0n~ c\eJY delta lime 
un:!. l::.ETLl\l dctcrmme, the mean number of] eqU1pment types ofumts oftypc i lo~aled 
at node ]\,- at time t It de~ignate~ [his value as ~/Ul :-':,1). and computes a COJTcsponding 
\anance'l(uj,NJ) These values do not represent thc doctrmal number ofasqets the 
enem\ ",ill ubsCT\c rC~j{hng at node N at time t. however They are dlstortcd somewhat 
through th(' u~c ofa ~('n:,or standard errol facto: 1/S,Rt), the standard de\latlOll of 
,en,Of S while observm¥ node N at tIIne t Note that this standard de"iation accounts fOJ 
different Ie,cls of sensor effectivene% m daytlme use vIce mghltlme. or orh~r times of 
!inllted \'Islbihh 
1\0\\ El:TLM can calculme llS perceptIOn of what forces it IS encountering at node 
1\ and time !.I1'-""11 [1,-..,,:, IS a ulnction offourargument<; 
• II a vector representmg the combmation ofposslbk umb prc~ent 
• xl(1} the number oi'l type tqllipment otsen'ed at l!me t on a gl,en node 
• t ThescenilJlotlfne 
• '\ A. parllcul~~ node In EETLl\1 
Recall that n) "II (u,x](0) O,'!'.l), tht' Imti"l prior dlstllbutton at the .<;tall o(the 
s~"naIIO sh(nvs all COmhlnJllOlb DrUm!, at all nodes to be equally hkely To slInphf, lhe 
equiltlon ~hr,)ugh \\hlcn th(' po~tenor updates ale perlurmtd, let 
2tJ 
and let 
B ~ 2,,(v'IU l\,lj-t r;(S,',t») 
rhc !-'USltrlOr dl~tnbutlun can nov. bc computcd b: the followmg 
n (1-1)1 i 1 X) = ('>l-n 
where C I" d nOImahllng constant. x(t+ 1) letCrs to the new sensor updme. and x(t) rcfeJs 
tr' the pa~t ~ellS0f upd~les 
,\, a mean, oj plevenlmg Implausible I-'erceptwlls from bemg entered Into the p!Jor 
dlWli'.ltlon EETLJ\J employs a s!mple checkmg procedure 
If 
fHl:.N 
Set COI~cspondmg momenh to aji and aJl lespectl\ely 
c\'\ID 
Recompute the poslenor dl,tnbutlon 
r he Tea'"Jr) fur IllLludmg Ihis Lheclmg mecharmm I, that caher side ma\ get 
11ldCCurd1e repon, frOTlilhelJ re~pccll\e ~en,ur~ wh)cl1 may lead them to mCOIleet 
c-onclll~l~m, rcgoOJdlll,t; [hell opponent', Te howevc:, the! reGCI\C ~n update thall~ 
(S) 
OldSlical1\ d.!lerenl frum "hal b expeckd (1 e what is currentl:- bem!! carned In the pnor 
(J' hl~ srJ.H llloO\ IJllder1dke "hen reLel\dn~ banleiield rcp()n~ from subordl1lnte., If d rcpun 
'1l1,,~e, ~efl~t:' lrl tel lib or what I, expected then ttley WIll accepllt. Ira does not, then the 
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r(:pon md\ b.: rejected out of hand and the commander's expectations or JSSumptl()n~ are 
F. PERCEPTIO]\" OF CO'\IBAT PO\\ER A"" I) C3 CAPABILITIES 
On<:c a unn IS detccted and a percelVcd OOB IS calculated, EETLM bef'.m~ to 
de\elop a ~omputed perception ofthat umt\ abilities, both In terms of combat power and 
Comm,wd L antral, and CommUl1lCatlons (('3) CdPdblhty This esomallon 15 dependent 
uplln t\\U ke\ fa<:tor~ thc d<:tual (.:omhal rower of the urnt (D(N.t) for defendmg forces at 
node" al time t and A(N.t) for anackmg forces). and the accman \\Jth which a lim! c,m 
e';lImate dn opponent's eapabdltics (CS(E)) Both of these value~ are proVided b\ the 
anal\st III the * '\jET data file 
The eSllmated value for the defendmg force~ level of combat powel (fJ(N ,til IS 
d;a\\n from a Umform distribution with parametcr~ that arc based on the true cdpabihtJe, 
orthe ddendCI at node N and lime t (D(N.Il), 
D Lmform[O,Cp(L)*D(N,t))] 
1 he attacker'~ estimated level of combat capability I~ abo Umforml! dlawn, but I[S 
paraITIeter~ are more complex than the defender's estllnate The level of tile defender's C3 
ability at time t (UcCt) plays a crucial role in the calculation of X Cf'.:" , t) The caicuiaiions 
In>oivethreestcp, 
• FIN, determrnmg.lhe estmlated \alue arDell) [1:4 (10)] 
• Second. caiculaungh(Dc(tI). d vaiu<" (beTwet:n zero and one) that plo\'lde, 
\3lJaiJlhty fi)r the defcl1der'~ estlmale of the attackels comuat powel [Elj (11)1 
• 1 fllrd rdndoml) drav.,mg .,\(,\, I) tram a Unlftlrm diStil billion \\1111 par~fII"kr~ 
based on h(De(tl} and ACN.tl [l:q (I~)I 
]) (I) \.mfclm11([) (/I-f '), D (r)-rt' l] (10) 
I, rllrremlv a rcal number betv,een Lero and one and IS a measure of the clllad .. mg 




J-(,u,D (t)( (11) 
'\('\,1) limfonnllA(N tl (l-hc(D,tt))),(A(N,tl (I-h (t)))J (12) 
G" PERCEPTJO'l OF CO(;RSl:S O"F ACTIONS (COA'S) 
I he final maJ0! process undeflaken by EETL:Vlm the perceptIOn update c)clc is 
the updating ofth~ p<;'-"<;el\ed COA~ for ed<;h sIde 111 the ~cenario ConflIct The Early Entry 
Theater Level Model focuses primanlv on two-sided conflicts (i e, Red v, Blue), but 
(lther '.allant, of tile model can expand thiS to any number of sides and factlOlIS de~ircd bv 
the user For tim t~esis howe\ec diSCUSSion will be limited 10 a COnflICt With two 
Upr()~mg forces - Ihus I' OJ each perception updme c"cle there ale 1\>,0 fOA perceptions 
hemg romputed mdependent uf ea(;h other For the purpose~ of this theSIS, an a\enue of 
approach ('\:\) h J.lcfineJ..! a, one or more pclthq (I e, di~<;rcte routes) between two 
<;peeli"ied ph,sl<;all1odo:~ In dl~eus~lJlg the fOA perceptions, several vanab!e, need 10 be 
ddineJ I he, are 
• I"AA(:-") The detcctlOn rate for iI gi\en avenue of approach at node N fills 
value b drawn dlrectl, trum the * NET data fill'-
The mCdn dete<.:tlon ratefora given a\cnue ofapprodch alnode l\ for 
tho: fl'l rerJ.catlOn of EETLJ\f<; . nlllll-simulanoll' [Ref; p :'4] 
• SI(:--.I.J.k) The ltb ~en~OI observation by ~ensor J over node l\ dUlll1g the kth 
c\cle 
• 11\ J2(1) Sensor J's ,allanCe ofelror on the Ith ohsenatlOn avel node N fhls 
number I~ also taken trom the * NET data fik 
• bk(N) Tota! number of sensor observations taken at node N during cvcle k 
• Nu\ .. A..k) The 'iet or all nodes that can be occupied for each avenue of approach 
A'\mcyclek 
• Uck) The likelihood afeOA c dunng cycle k 
• U(c.AA) The number of unit, follOWing COA c on avenue approach A-\. 
• C Total number of CO A's defined In the * Nl:.l data jik 
[FILM first computes the probability that U(e.A..'\) umts arc able to tran~lt 
through a specific avenue of approach \\-ithout being detected \PuCk.A .. A,r) ThiS 
complllallllll \~ c:arTlcd out through 
(13) 
1 hl~ prolldbdlty I." determined utilizlllg R "miru-simulatlons" in whlC"h the exposure 
lime OfWllt<; along an avenue of approach, their compOSItion. and their detection by the 
Opposlllon'~ sensors on the rth iteratIOn of the mini-simulation IS calculated [Ref 3 P 
~3 j ObVlDllSly. the probabiltty of a unit being detected while tlansitmg the avenue of 
.'.ppIO.l.ch b one rnmu~ the value ofLquatlon (13) 
V,llh the re~ults tram Equation (I J j, It IS nen"" Pll~slble to compute the hkellll()od 
that the Cn"ill\ IS pursUJng eOA e dUllng cJcle k (L(c,k)) Thl~ IS accomplished through 
BJ\ estan updatlllg of the probabtltties of dClectlon~ for the dlfterent avenue, ot JpprOJch 
ofCO-\ ( o\cr the update cycles \... Thtre ale thn:c dl~tl1lCl sitllatl0ns 111 \\'Iuc!~ Ul kl 
must be computed. each requlllng a ~hghth llit1erent equati,'n These Situations alt' 
• Ca~e one ~emor~ tletect lIlllb movlll~ all all a\cnues of approach undCI 
eoA. c 
• CdSO: two S~nsoh detect unlt~ on ani) some ofthe a,enues of approach 
underCOAc 
• Ca~e three Sensor, detect no UllllS movmg on any of the av~nu~s of 
appruachunderrOAc 
(k A.A.,rl] 
where.) l~ tho: set of avenues of approach where detectIOns occulled Case two I~ 
.. \- ~wre (11' the set of a\ enues of approach on \\ hleh no detections occurred and Q' l~ the 
where P 1\ the set of avenues of apPlOach where no detections occurr~d 
Tht; output., ofEljUdlJOTl . ., I 14). (! 5), and (16) above w!ll b~ u~td as lfle prior 
dhlnhulion fOI ddel mllllllg: tne rereelved cnemy eOA (nCOA) with one exception At 
thl; Hlltlal ufJdate oc!e, the pnor distribution I~ such that all possible eOA's are equally 
Ilkd\ TIm dlStrlbll:101l <:dn b~ molilfi<::d by thc user to reflect some prc-contllct 
l1l:clllg<:nce bLJt for this theSIS no pie-combat kno\\ledge I, as,um~d 
EFTI M noy" cdlcul.lle, the p'l'b"bollt\ til"t the enem, i, pur~ul1lg a spcClfic CO·\ 
bCC~lll1l; [lUt of the Pilot dlSlIlblltl(l11 tOI one side's final perception or the oprmlllg 5Idc'~ 
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eOA for cycle I,. nCOA(c.k-+ I) IS llself a Bavesian update of all pn'"\ lousl~ perceived 
CO A., up LO cycle k ~[]d I~ calClJlated a, follows 
(17) 
1 he [1c:-.l step In oe'tcnninmg the final perceptIOn of the enem\'s eOA IS to 
detelmmc the mean and \mmnce of the number ofj-tvpe assets at nodc N dunng cyck k 
(IllN 1(1,.) dnd \ "i/(k), le~pec;ll\el~) for those UlUlS that are undetected duril1t! cyclek 
m,. (18) 
(19) 
hom these two calculations, the tolal mean and vaTlance ofj type a~~ets over all 
node, of a given avenue of approach (mj(AA,k) and \) 2(AA,k) potenllall~ occupleJ 
ounng a ~reelfic Cycle edn be found by summing the mdividual mean~ and variance~ 
m,1 AA,k) = (20) 
1."(AA,k)- (k) (21) 
1 he probabilnv ora given umt actudlly bemg un am pmticular a\enue of <lppruach 
I' Itself a random \ariable Normally distributed with a mean specIfied m the * NET data 
file The stdJldmd deviatIOn of this dl~trJbutlon IS 10% oflhe mean 
(J" (.IA.k.'J=O l.ll,iAA k.c) 
lla\mg the applOpnate \i!1UC for Uc,k). the TIt:xt sUer l~ to compute d :-'ormal 
dl~tllhutlon utilizing a un][ '(onnal densay fimctlon and the moment values computed 
above 
The llndl step of cdlculatin~ the actual pOStcrior l.hstributlUn repre~entmg the 
pruhabilll:> that a unit v,lll bc folluwm>.! COA c durmg a given cvde k- I ((.,kll)) 
I~ (-!I\ en b, [Re~' I ~ P J ~ I 
Il"i.(c.k)·nns.(AA,k,c) 
n"'''~( k+I'I= 12~) 
, . ~n",<(c.k) on.;-,(AA.k,c) 
"P[ldlC, m future c,cles ThiS recur<;IW relatIOnship b reprc~enratlv(" of the fact that 
i-.nol,'kdglO 01 cn<::m\ Intention'. tend to have an accumulatlrlf!. elIeet Thus as ne\\ 
Intciligence comes In It l<; IncorpOIated m((1 an eXisting set ofprccOlKelved Idea., ofVvhat 
the enemy I~ expected to do A.~ prevloush stated. It l~ belie\ed that this IS a reasonable 
apprO'<lllldtldn ufrh" rroce~~e5 utilized b\ commanders in actual comba1 
H. i\PPLlCABlLlTY 
rhe mechanism, discussed above. and the remairung EEl 1,1\1 functiom d~ well, 
"'lOre' applied 0111, 10 glound combat modehng PriOI 10 thIs thesls :'-lever before Ilad 
I'YTl \t 01 liS pledccessor FTLM, been appiJed to the modeling OfJOlllt combat 
opcratiOn~ ~uch as Iho~e descnbed m Chapter 11 The reason for thi~ I, beyond the ~cope 
oft:1l<; theSIS. bur it l~ beheved that th", EETLM arctutecture Clln modelloint combat as 
well a~ pure naval operations The next chapter will di~cu% the modifications mack w 
EETLM In mder to make It atrulY.l0mt model 
IV. !\10UlFIC\TlOr.. OF EETL.\-l 
.\. THE PRIOR DdS"II"\fG MODEL 
A! the stdn of this thesIs project EE1LM was capable ofmoddmg grouno and dlr 
\-ombd' utiliLlng an arc-node repJeSematiOn of the Korean Penm~ula The ~elcctlon of 
Ko:ea J.~ the theater ofactlon v,a~ arbllrary. J.nd the documentation of the IllltiJ.1 version of 
1::.1 1 Lr>. 1 - J.t ~ 1(:'\ e: of detail bevond Iha! of the prevIous chaptel of tIll'; thc~l~ - can bc 
found IJl RefelenLc [J] Rc~olutlon orthe model \'>d, J.t th~ bfl!!adc Incl fo: ground 
for';,',dnu <It the !lIght le\eltorall unlb r--.<lval f(ln;c,v,crenn1modcicd i\ nel\\orkof 
sea no,ie., \\as dc\eioped, but never used in the testing and eVdluatlOn conducted 1Il 
RefcrCIl~C P] It was decided to conllnuc the development ofr:E.TLM from the 
foundallOll of the anginal 17 rr.~1 Korean scenano l'his denslon v,u, ba~ed on the deSire 
nOI \(l reCleale \.\ork alread\ accomplished. as well a~ tile desl[(> to build a model eo\crmg 
d thealer of adilin thai rrJa) ~ome day prove to be of slg!llficant stlateglc IIltele~t 
H. ADDITIO/'l.· O.F NA VAL FORO':S 
Blue f.{Jrce~ 
In order to IIltegrate ::\"aval and Manne capabdmes Into EETLM, a new ctaraba~c 
w~~ CDn~trudecJ clJntaming relevant mformatlOll on LT S Navv combatams For thIs 
thesl~. 1V,() t~ pc, of combatant gruups wele chosen an A ..Jfcraft Carner Bdttic Group 
(( \'BG) and an .. \mpi"llbIOUS Task Group (-\TGJ The compo~ltlon of these 1\\0 gJOUp~ 
,:, ilsteJ Delo\\ (llelailed InrOrnldt\0n on lhe naval clJmbatants IS proVided 11": Appendl\ 
B) 
• CYllli 
I ;-.JL\lnL class Nuclear '~\Jrcraft Carner (CV\) 
I T1CO'\'UEROGA. ela'is Guided l\1JssJ!c CnJI~er «(G) (VLS variant) 
I SPRLANCE cla~s Destroyel (DO) (VLS variant) 
1 PERRY claSg GUided MIssIle Frigate (HG) 
I TARAWA cla~s Amphibiou, A~s,iUlt ShIp (LHA) 
1 \VASP elass AmphiblOus Assault Slup (UID) 
I WHTDREY ISLAND class Amphibious Dockmg Stup (LSD) 
I ~t:\\'l'ORT class Tank Landlllg Ship (LST) 
The comp,)Sltlon of the C\ 13G wa~ ch()~en based on the profes,ional experience of 
I Ill: duthor ,\11 shIps of the CYBG are front lllle combatants typical of HlOSe ~cnmg today 
ill Carrier Battle Groups throughout the world Additionally, these ship types due to theIr 
relaTively young ages, are destined to become the backbone oCthe U S Navy Surface 
Fleet as the current tlend of ship decUmmJ.%IOmngs contmue 
The composition of the ATG was chosen based Oil mtervle ...... s conducted wlIh 
O!TI';CI s on s:aff aT the AmphibIOus Warfare SchooL Little CreeK. Vlrgllua Theil mpul 
"a<; \a'uable for the cOnstructlOll of the amphibious portion of the EETLi'yf naval database 
In tlwtll prm'lded \enficanon to the authN that the~e ShlP~ were Indeed typical ofth(1,e 
u~eu \{)r deployed Arnphlbl()ll~ Task Groups. and with thl.: exception of the Nf.\V.PORT 
LST s v"ere all deSignated to be pan ol"the amp)nblOus fleet of the ::'.Iq centul""Y 
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1 he d~ta descllbing the tap~billlle, and charactellS(ICS or the,e ~fllP' were gathered 
.Hld emered 1010 an EETl!\'1 database o\'e; a three month penod Th(" format tor the 
datdbd~t I~ given a~ Rderence [5J The ~lLe Oflh~ actual ~ NET ~nd * ORD tiles utllw;:ct 
trll~ scen~rlO [Ref 6J \\h1le small 10 sIze relative to other combat models, I, too large 
tu be I1\cluded IJI this thesis Tile d3t3 entered In the ~ i\FT tile were gatheled pnm,mly 
jrorn l<lflt'S FH!:litln" Shills [Ref 7J 3nd gUide to the SO\let Na\'\' [Ref 8J A. 
undJ~,lfi~d fCH e3se of de\elopment It IS emphasized that the capabllllll:S of the l' S 
I\av\ ships listed In tht FETL/vI databdse, and ally lnferences to them elsewhere 1fI thIS 
[he~I". are no! official figUle5 and should not be construed as ~uch Howevel. once the 
bll h Fntry' Theat~r Level M()dell~ vahd,Hed and I, used 1'01 actual do'.:tnnal analysIs, the 
IIllol 1ll3!Jot; 10 thiS database fik can eJ~lh be modified to rdlect the tnlc capabilnies and 
IlIl\l,alI01l~ of the na\al force~ 10 be modeled 
2. Red Forces 
Due to the deSire to lest the algonthm, ofl::.F.TUvl to the fullest extent possible 
Ihe enC!TI\ OOG was broadened to include force<; from rnulnpk countries Includmg hedv'y 
\>,ar<;h:p" from the former Soviet Umon Thb enemy (lOB l~ r,'cogmzed as not bemg tnlly 
't'prC'Cllt.HI\C ui Ihe na\31 capabllnies of the DemocratlL People, RepubhL ufKored 
(DPRJ<) bUllll~ !TIt~nded onh dS a mecilam,m fur te~tmg the ~arahll!le, or"the naval 
\ ,lrldn; oj EETLl\.j A, stated earlier the comp etc and dCculate OOB can 
t(lr,e~ were Qr,)r..t;n mto [\>,(l mdlDl Surface ActIOn (J10Up~ {::'A{j's1 and their detailed 
C'lPdDJllllC . ., d,e IfIcluded as AppendiX C t\~ a Slllllmar\', they are listed below 
• &,c SA.(, 1 
• I KlRO\' class Nuclear Battle ('rUlser (BCGi\') 
• I KRf~SlA I cla% GUided MlSSlic Cruisel (CG) 
• I MOD KASEr:\' class Guided Mmile Destroyer (DOG) 
• I SOVRc\1El\ ,\YY class GUided MI~sde Demoyel (DOG I 
• ReiLS-.C~Ci..2. 
• 2 USA II Ml~sile Patrol Boats 
• I !\ASUCHKA III class GUlded Mlssile Corvette 
SAG I l~ Intended to test EETLM's ablhty to model large ~calc naval engagements 
Irvolvlng smfflce-IO-surfdce mJ%ile (SS\1) firing~ at over-the-honzon (OTll) ranges 
'-, A.(i :. IS deSigned as a small, maneuverable gunboatlml~,lle boat threat as IS tradllionalj\ 
exrected In a littoral combat envlronmem Agam, these SAGs are not intended to portra~ 
the combat capablil1Je:; of the DPRK Navy, but mstead to provIde a method oftestmg the 
abllJt\ of EETLM to model naval combat m aJomt envIronment 
C ADDIlIO."iAL MOO{"FICATIONS 
Ph}~icaJ and Transit Nodes 
The prevlOusl) exrstlng grolmd model was expanded to 35 physical nodes thllTl ;he 
unglnd. J t> ].!hY~I.;:allludes TranSIt Iludes Wefe Increased from 2S nodes m the ofl!-jlndl 
mode! lu 9:2 Ilclce<; Ongmal de~lgll ofthi~ \eNOIl of EEl LM Galled for signifit.:antly 
~I eater Ilumhcrs of nude~, both ph\SlCal and tranSIL hut due to haldware limitations III the 
de,J,wr c()fJlputeh utillLec. lnl~ number v.a~ reduced In thl' future. n mdV become 
necc~,al' to rclot.:at<.: ITTL \110 a more powerful pJOcE'ssmg plattorm!ll older to hanJk 
IdfgC, <lIlU nlDrt' dt'tailt:ti dr, nodt m'l\Hlrks The charactcnsllcs or these nodes v.t'Je alst) 
nhldlfied to alloy, for th~ nlodellng or real ilk movement eharacterisncs of ships al sec. 
v~:'u, lho~e ora grdund Ul1l1 mDvlng llVer Lind ACG()rdmgly, [[TLM has the abdlty to 
lake Into ;iU'ount the follLlwlng characteristics goyermng Ihe movement ofn,nai Units 
• Sea state 
• Depth of water constraints 
• Wldthofchannclconstralnts 
• Pre<;ence of mmdicld~ 
CharaGtenstlcs ~uch d~ pledlCted sonal langes at a given locatiOn and the presence 
or absence of JCOu~th' ph~!1omenon such as convergence Lone, ha\e not yel be~n 
In(orporaled Discussion ofrecoTIUllendatlons for future modJiicatlons of EETLM WI)) be 
reserved fOf Chaptel \lofthlsthesis 
2. Cruisc:"'lissiles 
AddllIonal modificatIOns to EETLM mclude the abill!'y to model tactical crUise 
11l1~~lle~, speclticalh thc Tomahawi.. \,bOlh the anti-ship I,TASM) and land attack (TLAM) 
\Cf\lO!1) and Harpoon CRllse missiles These missiles v.ere not provided t0r In the oflgmai 
VCf~l()n oi'ttus model, but an.' now Integrated in the air network ofEI:TLM Allhe time 
oftaunch. these cruise missiles appear on the air network In the air gnd correqponding to 
the lo<.:atlOn of the launch platform At thiS point EETLM dlstmgulshes belweeTI n\o 
tvpe, {)fTm~\!l~s pre-programmed "sman" missiles such as TLM1 and non-programmed 
'dumb" ml,~!le~ ~uch d~ Harpoun and TAShl TLAM emplO\~ d v.e!ghted Diikstla'a 
Algorithm that ali(l\\s the ml~,!le 10 \eleCllh~ 1Il0~t direct pdth to the target, while 
d\Oldmg \\h,lll~ perceived hy the finng platform to be the ellem\'s most dTecllve air 
defenses T!llS IS a Similar proce~\ d~ IIMt undertaken by Tomana\\f. ml';SIOIl plannels 
when (kvelopmg the flight profiles the nussdes take to thell larget" 
Harpoon and TASM cruise Illi~~ile~ tly a direct path to their targets WHhout rc'i!iHd 
fOI pelcelvt'd enemy air defenses It IS acknowledged that both TASl\l and Harpoon ha\c 
limited flight rath rlOgrdmrnmg capubllllleS bUI thest capahlhtle~ are not as extenslve.b 
TLAM, and tllr the purposes ofthis model <Ire not consldeled 
The current model does possess a dynarmc algonthm 10 determme when m a 
sc,"nUIIO Tomahawk and/or Harpoon atlack~ should occur These deCision rule, arc 
cle<:igned lD allow EETLI\1 to dvnamicallv deCide whether 10 engage an enemy naval 
combdl.JJlt \\Ilh CllllSe mls~lIes 01 wah ~tnke aircraft dependent upon tW0 tactors the 
lange of the enem" combalant, and theavaliahiht) ofstnke allcrat1: 
Range I, a entlea! factor III the deCision rule because If an enemy ship IS 100 close 
tn a fnendly ShiP, the time reqUired to schedule and launch an air some may be too gleal, 
thu~ the qUI~kc~ option of a CIlJISe missile attack IS called fOf As range ftom the enemy 
,;fll:llllc>lea,<:~. the reaction tlmefoflhefriendl:.' slup also mcreases and an alfCraft strike 
can be consldeled Adumonali), by taklllg the aircraft opllon (when avadable) CllJlSC 
ml,~llc~ an; cO!1ser\ed, which IS a SenOLlS conSideratIOn m real world naval combat 
Becau.,e the purpose of the naval forces Ul the !tttord! \\arlare envmmment b tu 
support the ungolll£' ground combat. the number ofaircrafi avatlablc for auackmg enem\ 
,urliee shIps IS a consldclatlon 1Il the deCISIOn rules for naya! sUlface stnkcs The carner 
hd,cd ~tflkc aircraft arc aSSigned smke mlSSlOns agamst ~h()re ha'ied targets that an; or 
either ~trateg.!C mlercst. Of are In support of lac tical oblcctlVe~ bemg pursued by ground 
f,'lce, It I, not de~lred 10 dl\crT thc~e aLreraft t1C'lll thell aSSigned ltllS>lon [() SUpr('rt 
,hlj.l-tu-shIP CI:gagement.o unit'S'> the dIVer~l()nl' entlLdl to the SUr\I\al of the tlu",atened 
ship '-<(ltt:: thdt tho.: schedullJlg of ~o;-1Ies fOi gr0und strikes I~ ~lflpted in the * ORD lile UI 
the Cl1rr~nt model but w!ll be dvnanucalh schedukd III future 'versions of the model 
Th+.:: p,cudo-code for the schedulmg algonthm I, a~ follDw, 
'20U "\:\1 
'9mD 
THI::N Schedule All craft Stnke 
ELSE Use Crul,e "/Vflssdes 
fF2UUNhl JOO:,\M 
,\ND;; SHike t;U ~D 
lHL'\ ScheduleAlIcraftSmke 
ELSr l;~e Cruise ~lIsslles 
THE"\" Schedule AIrcraft Strike 
ELS[ Cse Cruise Ml,~lb 
3. r\aval Surface-to-Surface Engagements 
Engag~1HelllS betv.een suriaee units wele not previousl\, modeled In EETLM, nm 
even betv,.een ground unm. unless the opposing units were on the same physical node 
Becau.,e of thiS, two separate algorithms were deSigned une for etose range indirect fire 
and one lor long rang.e OTJ-l mi%iles 1 he algonthm for the conduct of dose range file, 
be I: from "':m) anillcl) .. 'vlultlple Launch Rocket Sy~tCnlS O"lLRSj, or Na\J1 Gunfile 
Support (,GFS I from ships IS documented IT1 Reference r9] 
In ll10dcllng OTH engagements ben ... een naval combdtMns tv.o probkm~ eXist th~ 
deCISion to {'ngdge. and the selectIOn of the appropnate \\eapon \\nh whJCh (0 engage 
TIK cn!.\,lgement dlgnnthm commences when an enemv Ulllt IS detected on a phy~l(;dl ur 
tranSI( node, and I, gIVen b\ the following pseudo code 
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I (akulate range to enem) 





To select the best \\eapon to fire. the algonthm select~ tht.: \\capon with thE' 
mlllllllUIn range such thalthe weapons range IS greater than rall)<c to thc target for 
example. let ranges be a~ fi.,Uov,$ T AS\.1 - 100 mile~. Harpoon ~ 50 m..iles, enCID\ = 7"3 
nilies cFl L \'1 woulJ ~elect to engage wIth TAS!\1 slnec 11 IS thc onlv one wIth a range 
t'l edkJ than the range to the enemy Now let enemy range = 40 nnies EETLM would 
110" {;ho()~e HdrpOUll ~lllce It has suffiCient range to strike the enemy and v.ould notlesult 
lTI the unnt.:t.:t.:S~4r) expenditure ofa long.er range v.eapon 
4. Strike Operations 
Smhe operatIOns, con~lstlllg by ddinItl(ln of both aircraft and TLAM Jlr-to-
g.round stflKes are all Integral part of the :\"avy·s ~upport of combat a~hm~ AI~o referreo 
[(':1' W"\CI pruJection. 11 I~ mtended to aid glOund fllrCt~ In the attainment of 
l'eOiP,,-phlCdl nh)tctlve, by altntlng enemy force,> before close )<, ollnd combat IS JomeJ 
EETLM h:l, the abdlty to model stllke opelatlom. both alf anJ TL,\I'v1 through tilt fill~ 
rnS,lon 'llId.-lIT ta~klng operatIOn> (-\"1'0) sectIOns of an addItIOnal data file lefelred to a, 
the' OR\) file l[Ret b[) The ~ ORD tile lists allinlormation ncc·ded fOI EETL\J \0 
J& 
schedule. execute, and evaluate strike operations. Some ofthe data included in the 
"'.ORD file are launch platform, target node, time on target (TOT), and salvo/flight size 
One characteristic of EETLM's strike operations modeling capability is its ability 
to prevent the conduct of strikes on target nodes that are perceived to be friendly. It: as 
the striking side perceives the situation., a target node is friendly, BElLM will 
automatically cancel the strike mission This prevents potential blue-on-blue engagements 
in a manner that reasonably models true combat strike planning. A limitation of the 
current version ofEETLM is its lack of ability to spontaneously schedule and execute 
strike operations The current practice of scripting these operations through the'" .ORO 
files is an acceptable temporary solution, but future versions ofBETLM will require an 
ability to dynamically conduct strike operations during scenario runs 
5. Shipboard Air Operations 
The prior version of EETLM allowed air operations to be conducted only on 
physical nodes designated as air bases. This practice was not appropriate for the modeling 
of naval flight operations. Ships of all classes cannot be reasonably modeled if they can 
only conduct flight operations at fixed geographic locations. Mobility is a key factor in 
naval warfare. thus any valid model must allow for flight operations at any transit or 
physical node. The integrated version ofEETLM accomplishes this by designating each 
ship as a mobile airfield, thereby allowing air operations - both fixed and rotary wing-
from all naval ships with embarked aircraft 
6. Embarked Marines 
With the integration of naval forces, it became necessary to equate an amphibious 
task force into some type of ground threat in order to allow these forces to affect 
EETLM's perception of the ground war This was accomplished by defining in the'" NET 
file an equipment type for both personnel and tanks, then assigning these types to the ships 
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in the ATG's. By following this procedure, each time EETLM conducted a sensor sweep 
ofthe nodes containing amphibious ships, it would "see" • in addition to the ships· an 
appropriate number of ground troops and tanks This allows the presence of an ATG to 
affect the perceptions of the enemy with regard to potential Blue COA's, in the same 
manner as the presence of an ATG off the Kuwaiti coast affected the thinking of Iraq 
during Operation Desert Storm 
In addition to modeling amphibious feints, this ability to embark ground troops 
makes available the option to explore new force mixes. Ground troops (be they Marines, 
Army, or a mixture), can easily be embarked on any type of ship and in any size desired 
Modeling and evaluating the effects of embarking a Marine contingent on an aircraft 
carrier, or of placing an Army special forces helicopter detachment on a destroyer or 
frigate, is wen within the abilities of the integrated version ofEETLM. 
7. Dynamic Scheduling of Ship Movements 
Ship movement within EETLM is dynamically scheduJed in response to EElLM's 
perception of enemy attack time (AT) AT is determined based on the perceived buildup 
of logistical supplies by the enemy forces prior to the commencement of hostilities (the 
logistics algorithm is discussed further in Chapter V. and is documented in Reference [9]). 
Due to the necessity of coordinating the insertion of Marine forces with the movement of 
Army troops, it was necessary to devise a way to ensure that amphibious forces would 
amve at the designated landing zone when !!Cheduled and that the transport of Army 
personnel aboard Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) could be modeled 
The scheduling of arrival times for naval units are dealt with differently for CYBG 
units than for ATG and !\.1PS ships. CVBG units are assigned a scenario arrival time, 
relative to AT, at which point they will start their transits and air strikes in accordance 
'\It!i tne * NCT and ORD data files It: after the attJCk tullC 1\ e~tabhshed and the 
C\TIG annal time I, determmed, !\T should ch~Tlp:c then the (''vTIG wlll arnn~ at the 
scene either callY llr IJte (dependent upon willeh way the AT estimate was ~Il!fted) Thl~ 
lcflect<. the realll\ 01 sllualJOn" where e\ents unfold fdsterlhan the United States ca nget 
naval assets In place, or conversely when nd'>al unit, am\e qUld.!y m re~poTl~eto a 
pelcel\ed threat and f:nd themsel\"e~ W<lltln~ on station 
)-,): ATC, and l\.1PS ShlP" their embarked ground Unlb are a~slgned a landlllg tune 
In the eOA SCCllon of the ~ )lET filt> agam relative tt' perceived AT CETL \.1 then 
c~ICL,lat('~ b"ck the time II v,.I!1lake amphibious and .MrS ships 10 trans!! along the routes 
to tile iamlmg zone at theu defined cruise speeds The ShlP~ enter the s,,;enano at thIs 
crrkulrrted tlllW ana tldn5Jl to the a~slJ~ned landing zone. disembark their personnel then 
move to cl pal[oi statlUn 101 the rem~inder of the scenano ln the case of the amphlhious 
~hlp~. ~InCC then l\1:mne~ have d)~embarked, the slup\ are no lunger (;onsJdered a potennal 
ground threat and any further change~ !Il the ground eOA perceptIons are attnhuted only 
Battle Uamag~ As~cs~ment 
N<lva' bdttle damage a'isessment (BDA) IS accomplished 1Tl EFT LM through a 
lernpOla[v algorithm that perform, three tasks 
• !lctelllllne [t an ~Sl;l hl1~ the Intended target 
• Determine Iftl\(' target [~destroyed or Ifit retain, mlSSI,m capablht) 
• [J~le[nIlJle the e\.len~ (0 ",tHell a ddmaged target l,)~e~ operatIOnal 
capJbJl,l\, 
The ;irsl ~tep lJl this algornhm IS to assIgn a surface-tu-surface pI<, for each mlsslle I 
1 '\'\PK[J Ailer the missile IS fired. LfTL\l detemllnes the time offhgllt and thu~ the time 
or [mpaCl tOI lh~t panlCular engagemenT rhen FlTI.M dra\\s a landom number. X trom 
a Um:oml (0,1) dlstnhution lfX <. SSPK], then th~ target has sustained a hit NexL it 
must be detcrmm.:;d if the larget I~ dcstH)yed or ifn IS merely damaged Thi~ is 
aCC{)Tllrll~ned tnrou~n drd'Wmg d second Umform 1(1) Iandom \anable 'r IfY ,ume 
prevl()u~i\ ddim:d lhre~hold Ifor e\dmple G 50). then larget h destJoyed, else It IS assessed 
damage Lldmag.: l~ a~scs~ed by sel.:ctmg at random an Item of eqUIpment attacheJ to thl' 
slllP that 1M, been damaged, tbus effectlvelv reducmg Its combat capabllJt~· 
Due to the maJlner in whieh EETLM tracks forces moving across the sea-land 
net\Hlrk, engagement, dre nUl conducted on a ~Inp to Shljl baSI:;, rather the) are done on a 
hattl,' group 10 battle group basI~ "I rus level of re~olutlOn b reah,tK In term~ of lhe 
engaglllg side (~IIKe OTH stnkes arc usually coordinated at the battle group level) but 
leav.:s sometlung to he demed on th~ rccelvmg end of the engagement The result oftlus, 
howe\el, l~ that the particulal ship withm the targeted battlc group that IS actuall; 1m by 
the IfIcommg ml~~III::~ 'will be randomly ~elected [fit is determin~s a ship i~ de~troved, It IS 
rcm[)\ed trom Ihe baTtle group along wIth It~ a%oClated combat capablii!le~ 
More reailstic means fOI assessmg BOA eXIst. ho'Wever lhelr use m thiS \erSlOn of 
I-.I-_-J L\1 I" Impractical fOJ two rea~on~ the\ require a large databa~e ofmi~~ile warhead 
cdpabllitle,. ,mil thev must he able to model the systems and defenSive capabl!illes of 
rnOIJt:fTl combatants Both of these reqUIrement~ Imply a necessltJ for da~slfying the 
database to an appropnate seeunty level Smce the development of this model IS at th~ 
lITlela'~lfi[;J level and ~II1CC it IS deSIred to mamtam thIS model on J de~ktop computer. It 
I, h:ilncd that thl" algorIthm j~")1 BD';' I~ ~umCll::nt dl1d rea~0l1abl\ \alld fOI thiS thesrs 
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V. EFTLM ANALYSIS 
GENERAL 
TIll'; chdpter Jemonstrate~ the manner In Whllh EETLM can be employed b) maJur 
<;tafts In ordt"r to anal\7e thcater CDntHlj.!ency plans I hl" ~orth Korean :\1RC scenan() 
de~crlb,'D pWVlou,ly I~ w,ed as the tc~t case for thl~ thC~I~, Vilth the IS,UC of concern bel:lg 
the Impact that the arrival of naval forces has on the outcome ofthl;: contllCt Data 
collectIOn and anJiysls techmque~ \,ill be discussed In order to facilitate independent 
replll3tmll of these plOcedure~. as well as to illustrate the case with which this mouel can 
be ullhzed a, an did to dCCl<'H.m makl;:fS Additionally, the results of the analysis WIll be 
dl'Lu.,\I;:J "lib graphlca, Illu,tratlon~ where appropnate A~ ~tated In (hapter I, thiS thesi, 
h Illlended a, a demonsli atlon 0: EEl LMs potentia not a ,tatlstical analYSIS of as output 
data Thl, dl,tlflctmnlS maJe III Older to prevent glVlIlg the llnpresslOn the E!:TLM IS a 
full) functional mod!;1 A~ slated d~l;:where In thiS the,l" ~everal i~sues regarding 
EETLi\b OIll'rallng alfwnthms must he resolved hefore a statl~tH:al ~tudy is warranted 
Thele "Ill bc 1"0 distinct areas subjccted to analvsi~ conventIOnal MOEs such as 
Blue v, Red am.lIurl I,tles. alll] an anah>ls ortlle impact the arrival of naval force ... has on 
ReJ'~ percepl,on of Blue',., ('00\ Th!; rationale and implications behind the selection of 
the MOEs and ar. cxpbr,J!lon of why COo\ dnajY~ls b deSirable will also be discu~sed III 
the relevant 5ectlons of this chapter 
B. PROCH1I1RlS 
Run Uesign 
In [1ider lu addless Ihe ~reclfic ql1e<;llon ofh(m the lime ot'arrl\ill of naval umt~ 
affect th~ outcom, of a "lImal MRC \c~narJo. three ~~enarJO caw, for the <"nln of na",\l 
• Case One l"aval forces arrive two days prior to the perceived attack 
time (AT-2J 
• C.ru;f< .. :.r';'{S Naval forces arrive two days after the perceived attack time 
(AT+2) 
• .ca~ Three. Nava! forces arrive at the perceived attack time (AT) 
'\Ole lhal the afflva! ofnava! forces refers also to thc amval of Army land forces 
via vlaritlnle Prepositioning Ships (MPS) 
In addition to the three Early Entry cases discussed above, the scenario was 
modified in terms ofthe course of action Red will pursue_ For each Early Entry case, the 
* !'-I1:T file was modified to restrict Red to a single eOA Blue force~ were still allowed 
to select their COA in response to what they perceived Red would do based on the 
perceived rate ui lo~!stical ~to..:kpiljng done by Red prior to the outbreak of hostilities 
With thc~c ..:ilaractcristlcs_ each run was identified by the Early Entry case and b\ 
the Red eOA ~clecled For example, the scenario in which Red pursued eGA I and naval 
forces were to arrivc al AT' 2 was designated RI-E2; Red pursuing eOA 2 and naval 
forces arriving at r\ T was designated R2-E3; etc. This method of designation resulted in 
nine different COillblnailOIlS to study for the North Korean MRC scenario as illustrated in 
Table I 
EnfTl, Case 2 Entry Case 3 
RetlCO.4 J RI-E2 RI-E3 
Red CO.4 2 R2-E2 IU-E3 
Red COA 3 R3-E2 R3-E3 
1 <lale I Definllloll of EETLM Data Run Cases 
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For each of the nine combmatlons three repilcatlons of the EETL'vl ~cenano \\ere 
run and data C'Olieded (data collection methods are described In the next section) Thlee 
I epllcatlon, ",ert' ch()~en In mdeJ to demonstrate that data andly\l~ can ne conducted on 
EfT! \1 outpuh I! IS acknowledged that a sJmple sIze ofthlee IS not sufficient to 
acllle\e ~tatlstlcall\' significant re~ulb, but irJr this proof of pnnclple the slatlstl.:al 
~Igmlic'ance of these result, is Irrelcvant Glvt'n that the Imtlal characlefl~liCS ofthe 
.'>Lt'nano panlClpants dre nm valid (which - as dIscussed 1Il Chapter 1\' wa~ mtentionall\ 
made ~o In order to JvO!d classificatIOn Is~ues), the intent i~ to focus on demonstratmg 
hu>' EI-"rL'\1 can bcutillzed m strategic plannmg ralherthaliLD ~tr1Ve trJJ a statlstlcally 
~Igmfican[ analysls ot the scenario output 
2. Data Collection 
Dat~ were collected for thb analysb through aUlOlllatiC data output file~ generated 
h\ EL rt.\..1m ASell f(JfTml! The actual outpul data files credted by EETLM for thiS 
lhc'ib are rncluded rn Reference [I:J PonlOllS of the output data files arc glv~n In 
"ppenJI:>-' D so that the reader may become farru!Jar 'WIth theIr content and fonnat, If 
dC~lred for eac:h analy~l~ run conducted, the following data files were crcated 
• co >'I. data file fhe eOA data file contam~ the perceptIOn each slde ha'i 
Icgardll1g th~ lnt~nd~d eOA that the other side I, pursumg For cxample, a typIcal 
entr\ would re\eal that at time t ~Ide A btlleved that side B was pur~umg eOA I 
\~llh probabliltv X eOA 2 wilh probability Y. and eOA:; 'WIth probabihtv Z 
Dala f()llhl~ftle')H'genel:lledc"ef', <,ell'i01 uod:llencle whlCh for thlS <;CenaTIO 
• Lng..l);<cmcnl datafilC (()ntaH\~ the lime and re~ull, of ;tIl cngagements IrI thc 
43 
• LOgIStl<':S d<Hafile This tilt cont'lms loglstlc mo.ement rate~ and Blue s 
perception of Red', attack time Addltlonall\, tru~ fik l:ontams the amount offloat 
tllne beH\eenBlue's perceptIOn of attack tllne and scenario Slmtnne TIllS equates 
to the amount of slack tune Blue has to deploy foree~ to thl.: theater 1 f the float 
tune h po.,I!J\e Blue can deplo) loree, to the theater priol to the commen<.:ement 
of Jlll"!Jlitle~ If the i1oatume" negative, then ollt-of-alea forces will nOl be able 
h' deplo\ III time to alflve III theater pnor w the start of combat Both th.: 
percel\ed flttfl~k time and the float time are updated and recorded In tlus datafile 
every update cycle 
• Po~ltlOn Datafik rccord~ the ground truth positIOn oreach unn at each 
perCl.:pTlon urdat~ cycle 
• St~ength Oatafile r~cords the strenbrth of each umt m the scenflflO 
Each orthe dala files are named by EETLM to umquely Identify' the sccnano ~nd 
repilcatlon to 'WJlIch that datafile appiJes For example, gIven a ~ NET datatile 
defimng an El'TLM scenario, the eOA perceptlOns would output to a file called 
• enn (where no i~ an integer that Identifies to which replicatlOn of the scenario the 
ddtaii l!;" dPplle~) The engagement data file would he designated * Enn, the 
IUP'>IH.soata flle\\ould be titled • Lnn, etc 
The datd from these files were Imported mto Rpreadsheets utllizlllg Lotus ]·2·3 
relea~t: 4 son'Ware From there, graphical analysi~ ofthe data \vas conducted The results 
uf Ih~ dnal!~ls are dl~CU'ised In the next section of this chapter 
C. COA ANALYSI~ 
(ht'rHt'" of tht' Courses of Action (eOA,) 
Red has three eOA, Jefineu III Ihl" Nt: J dataftlc for use In tillS sc<,nario 
A.ddIIIOnally_ for each Red CO,\, there IS a correspondmg Blue eOA that was de~lgned as 
a deftm~e agalmt an atldek by the North KOieans aClos~ the Demilitanzcd Zone (Oi\1Z) 
44 
ror each of tile runs performed for this tlleSI.';, Red's (,OA v,.as pre-selected !II the * ,\lET 
dat~file and d 10tal of nine run~ were made under each of the Red (,OAs (thre!." for each of 
'helhreeentJ\ca,e,j 
Blue\ eOA selection \\as performed through the perceptron algonthm~ 01 
L[TL \1 A~ a pre-hostlltt~ maneuver Red mo\ed multiple logl~tlcal umt~ to front IlTle 
5taglllg areas utillzmg a loglsli('s movcment plan Ihalls uniquc to each oflhe three Red 
C()A.\ 'I hiS mo\ement IS done under the a~sumpll()n tiM! prior to an attack, Red wlll 
sLOckplie d sub,rantlal anmullt of logistic support at or near the DMZ A.~ detcctlOlls are 
made ')/ these logistic unl1s over the rhy~lcal and tran~Jt node~, ~ corrclation can be made 
11\ Blue a, to VvhlCh eOA Red I~ intending to pursue Once Red's Intended eOA IS 
known. Biue will then select the applOpnate defenme eGA (Blue's eOA I I, the 
defenSl\e response to Rcd\ eo.'\ I. etc) 
>\ddll1onall\, based on the perccl'ved rate ofmovcment for thc~e logistlcal UIlIU" 
Bill(' Cllmpute, lhe estimated time that Red will commence their southward attack 
(designat{'d d~ the vaT Jable ATI Once AT IS cakulated. EETLl\.l will schedule the 
nece.,.,ar, mO'vl:mcnt ofna\al and r\lPC; fCHces In order to execute the lroop landmgs 
de~lg[ld!ed In the !Jluc rOA (the dynamIC schedulmg of~hlp movement IS discussed l!l 
(haple: IV) If after XI IS computed, Hlue~ estimation ofRcd's attack time changes. 
then Blue w1l1 altemp: 10 n:-~~hcdule thc movement ofndyal and:\iPS assets accordlllgly 
Dlu~ mJ, not be able w mcct the Idnrlmg time, dictated In the eo/\ if their estllTiatc of I\T 
c 1Jnge~ s.gnliicamly Smlliarh If B ue'.> perception of AT l~ \-Hong, the landmg of the 
~larln"', <I,d ~\rm, tr(lojJ\ on the !\lP~ ,lllP~ "Ill nor o<.cur m tHnc to exccure the gnHi'lrl 
eOA;]~ pldnned ror a mure ddJded analySIS orlhe loglSllc~ bUlldup dlgontilm and ho" 
11 penaln'> to Hlue's pcrcepllOll of Red's eOA see Reielence [9J 
As wlth the combat capabilltlc~ ,lfthe DPRK mllitary lhe ..;ourse ofactlon<; 
5PcCltlCd mtlllS theSIS are not to be con<;\rued as ~n actual assessment of~or1h Korean 
nuhtarv plans 01 strategy, or as an official representallon of the Unlled ~tatc5' mtenued 
le~p()n:;t to an attack mtD South Korea 
Ground COAs 
Lnder (0,\ I. Red launche~ a two-plOng ground offen~lve along thc 
ea~lelll and western ,-(last (lfthc Korean pemllsula Thb attack I~ l<lunched uSing l"l 
dJ\ISIOnS dl\ldcct betw~cn the North KOiean cities ofHaclu. Pvongyang. v.,'on~~n. 
P'Yonggang, and Kosong Red'., ultlmale ground obJectl\cs are the South Korean CJIICS 01 
Kun~an. Kwangju. Pusan. Tacgu dnd Pohang 
eOA 2. mvoil.·es a two prong assault as well, but the thlUsts of the ground 
offensl\e consist of one push through the center of the DMZ with an associated attack 
dlol1? the western co~st of Korea The Initial ground forces are arraved slm!lar to those in 
COA' I\lth the exception bemg that there are no Red forces (and thus no logIstical flow) 
lulile r>..onh KOIt:dll CI!\, ofKosong Ult1m~te objectives for Red forces under CO'\ 2 ale 
t iw South kOI ean port of Pu~an and the CIt} of Pohang 
Red eOA 3 IS an all out attack by the North along both the eastern and 
western coasts coupled with d frontal attack through the center ofthe DI\1Z Attdckrng 
"Itil 1 ~ JIYI~lon~. the North Korean Arm\- launches their assaulb from llaeju. Pyongyang 
dllG \\ un~,m ~o for<:e~ or logl,llcal ~lOckr!llng are prescnt clsewhere along Ihe D\ll 
Ovel Ilillf or the ReJ forces (7 OUI of I ~ diVISIOn), and COnSeqllently a majority of the 
1();!I'!lc~ fhm, arc ccntered abollt the clly of Pyongyang pnor to the attack The final 
obJeCllve, of Red rOA ] arc the most ambitious ofa1l three COA~ They are the cllie~ of 
"un~an TaeJu. \\'OIlJlI, K,\angju, Taegu, Pusdn, Chungl\]. and Pohang 
Bill(' C(),A,~ (On~l,t of purely defenSive operatlon~ At scenario ~(art tht:rt: 
arc: Il' l' S ,0,.1 m~ di\l~hll1~ III Cl'umrv v.l1h anothel S. diVISions (includlllg I\\,O l" S 
\1anne Unl1S) deployms ullo the theater after [he scenano starts DIUcrcrlllatmg til" three 
Blue eOAs are the positions taken by these eight foUow on divisions. A detailed listing of 
unit positions, by eOA, for both Red and Blue forces can be found in Reference [9] 
b. Naval COAs 
Naval forces, under the current EETLM architecture, do not have the same 
eOA structure as ground forces. The Red naval units in this scenario travel from North 
Korean territorial waters at AT in search of Blue naval units to harass and interdict. Blue 
naval forces originate from source nodes to the east and west of the Korean peninsula and 
move up and down the coast as necessary in order to execute the aircraft and TLAM 
strikes required by the >I<.ORD file. When opposing naval units detect each other, 
engagements occur according to the algorithms described in Chapter IV, assuming 
hostilities have commenced (i.e., scenario time ~ AT). 
Movement of naval furces are controlled in the same manner as that of the 
ground forces (i.e,. a movement corridor is defined in the >I< .NET file for each eOA and a 
minimum cost Dijkstra's algorithm utilized to select the actual route taken), but due to the 
sparsity of the naval network, there is only one path for naval forces to take. Once 
EETLM transitions to a more powerful computer platform, movement of naval forces will 
be as diverse as the movement of ground forces. 
2. Results and Analysis 
The analysis given beJow is organized according to the entry case option chosen by 
the Blue forces This organization is in keeping with this thesis' attempt to investigate the 
effect that the arrival of naval forces has on the outcome of a littoral conflict For 
illustrative purposes. sample graphs from the twenty-seven data runs conducted with the 
North Korean MRC scenario using EETLM will be included in the body of the sections 
that follow A complete set of graphs depicting EETLM's performance, both in terms of 
eOA perceptions and MOE performance, is available to the reader in Reference [12] 
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Blu.e's perception of Red COAs 
(I) Blue Entry Case I Wben Blue utilized entry case I, a notable 
pattern emerged in the data As shown in Figure I, Blue had difficulty predicting 
accurately what Red's intentions were when Red was pursuing eOA 3 After the time of 
Red's attack (Day 6.0, approximately for the three replications of case R3~EI), in only one 
of the three replications did Blue accurately predict that Red was indeed pursuing eOA 3 
In the first replication, COA 2 was considered the most likely at day 6.0, and remained the 
dominant eOA for the remainder oftbe conflict. In replications two and three, Blue 
accurately perceived that Red was pursuing eOA 3 at the time tbat Red launched its 
attack across the DMZ, but shortly thereafter other eOAs became dominant. For 
example, in replication two Blue accurately predicted Red's intentions by day 6.0 with a 
perceived probability of 0.84, but by day 6.5 (approximately 12 hours after AT), eOA 2 
returned as the most likely Red eOA (with a perceived probability of 0.76) and remained 
so until day 7.25. From then until day 8.0 Blue re--established that Red was pursuing eOA 
3. After day 8,0, Blue never considered COA 3 to be the most likely course that Red was 
pursuing Thus for the last two days of the scenario (approximately half the period of 
aCllve hostilities), Blue misidentified Red's intentions 
rnCOA ' .... COA2 
_COA' 
Figure I Blue's perception of Red COAs under case R3~E1. 
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Thl~ pattern did not hold v.hen Red ""va, pur,umg other (OAs For 
C"dmrle when Red \\as pu:sulIlg COA 2 IFHJ,ure 2). Rlue 4\,:cUlatch Identified CO,\ 2 a~ 
i:><:lr.g Red', IJllended C0ur,e of 4ctlon .lust prior to day b U "'fhor tli4t lime v,lth the 
exceptIOn of one penod ohlnle la~tlng one-founh of a ddy In ~eenano ume. Blue never 
liht tile peleeptlOn that Red wa~ inde~d pur~umg eo A,. 2 unul the sccnallO ended 
1- BLUE'S PERCEPTION OF RED eOA" 
REDG"IOUNOTRUTHCOA2 
figure: Blul.:·s perceptl(Jn ofRed'~ COA under \':,\3e R:~-tl 
Thelaet that Blue had suehadlllicultllmeJdenufymgand 
nlJ.lTlt:l.1nlJlg th~ ,-orrect perceptlOn regdrdmg Red's eOA v. hen Red pursued COA 3 
should l'e a l\igh prlOntv concclTI for Blue strategic planners If the data In this seenanc) 
\\~re \')e dct:lal capabilities and CO!h that applJed to a Korean \iRC, thiS pattern could 
ITld.catc <i pmentl<tll~. ,eiOU'; weakness jJl the reeonndlssanee and !llLdhgencc capabdJl\ of 
\2j Blue EnLrv Ca<;e:2 LnJer Blue entf) cJ.~" 2, the same 1J.-I'.Lcrn 
emciged \\ hen Red pur<,ueu CO·\3. Blue \\"d~ unable to leliahl"J determIne Red'~ 
lntl'lltlr'n, AI A1 (agall1. approxlmateh da\ (J OJ Bluc held all CUA~ 10 be vef', clo~c 111 
t<.;rm\ urlli-.elJllOoJ Jil r<'pllc,ltlon three or ease IU-[2 {Red ('0 .. \ 1, i.:ntf)' Case 2). Blue 
correcth Iden:ltl("d R~d'~ CO'; Jt A 1, but nCver heiLl ontu [har. per.:eptlon for a substantial 
length oj,lmc III n:pllCdll,)[],OntJ.nd tv.o, the maJOlltyo(theper.:eptmnsallcrAl 
4" 
indlcatedCOAs I \,ere the mo<;t likeh course of act lOll for Red Smee these patlerns 
did not hold for Blue', pelceptlon of Red ('OAs 1 or 2 (1 e Blue more readily a,';crtained 
the actual eOA. Red 'Was pUr<;lllng). their I~ an even glealel reason to investigate exactly 
\\hal thl' Red torces ale domg under eOA 3 that causes Blue such confuwJ!\ 
(3) Blue Entry Case 3 Entrv case 1 continued the perplexmg 
p~ttern IIl\olvmg Red eOA 3. as shov.,n Tn Figure, As 111 the other entry case~. Red 
co,,,,, .> seemcd 10 confuse the Blue forcc~ the mo~t Over the thlee rephcatlOn~ of case 
R3-Ll. the pcrccptlOn~ ofallthlce COAs at AT were approximately equal (except for 
I ep]lcat.oll 3 IT! 'Whle'll CJ~C eOA 2 and 3 were approximately equal and eOA I was 
canSlrjered ~ome\\hat lcss lIkel)) The results from Red eOA ) and eOA 2 were slmdar 
t(1 thu,e npenellced unde) the prevIOus!\, discussed entl\ cases 
FI~lIre' 8h.;~\ perceptIOn orRell ('(JAs for case, RI-E3. R2-E3 R,-E3 
(4) Comlllent~ It I~ no! '1urpnS10g that Rluc's perceptIOn of Red's 
(0 j" doc~ nOI \af"\' greath o,el the three entry ca~C$ Red's actions are morutored 
thl out:h ~"n~or, that 3H" In thcdtef at ~ccnafl{) ~tart and ar~ md~pendent oCthe naval 
t(lfl':C~ The ldl.-[ th,il na,dl f()fLC' arrlvc before. at or 3.fiel the percel\ed Red aHJ.d tIm" 
rlo~, not dffecl th~ COA caJ..;ulalion~ ofth~ model (refer to Chaptel HI fo[ descnptlOn of 
how I~l-:'TL \1 <:()mrut~., rOA,. perceptions) 
\Vhat IS ~lgmflcant IS the pattern that was dJscovered regardmg Red 
CO A,. 3 CO-\ J 1<; slmi!dr to the other two wurses ofactlOn~. p~rhaps enough so that 
Blue IS COJlfibCd by thc (1b~ervatH)m It I~ takmg dunng the scenano Consldenng that 
COA I CDJ]Sl,IS ot::ln east 3nd \\C'it c()a~1 dttdc3K and eOA 2 I, a dual attack uo'Wn the 
\\','st (Odst dnd throut'h the center of the DMZ. !lIS po~slblc that (0,\ -' (I-'.;111ch cornbme~ 
th(; two C()A~ by ult,JLll1g a three pron,~ attack down botll COJSts and tllrough central 
"-orca) IS by Its V~'""· nalure, a cOUise of action that Blue simply cailllot readtl" idenlii)' 
Rcd\ Perception of Blue C()As 
11) Blut' Entrr ('ase I When Blue utlhzed ent!) ca~e 1, Red 
Jl'pcared 10 ha\t' dlfficultv In detcrml!1lng tht: actual eOA Glue v.as pursu11lg FOI 
~),ilTllpk III Ih" CJ~C v.h"re Red \~a~ pur~ulng rOA 3 and Blue utlilzed cntry case J 
(replIcatIOn:: orthb Cl\e I~ shown In Flgllle 4). Red correctly Identified Blue as followtng 
('0,\:;: - wiucli "as the ground trulh eOA Blue selected - only belween da) 70 and 7 5 in 
1"0 of the !hlee lepl:catlons performed In rephcatlOn one of case RJ-E I (Flgur~ 5). Red 
n~"el Idcntltlo.:ll CO A,. :;: .IS h~mg Bllle'~ mtended course of "CllOn For all repilcations, Red 
:luol'lenth hel(! ,m :tl t~e pe'L~rl!plllhd~ Blue was ut!ll7lng eOA 1tllrout!hout th~ 
mdlC)['l" 0; the sc~narllJ That Blue wa, pur~umg COA I \.\d' ne"cr d serious 
RED'S PERCEPllON OF BLUE COAs 
flgUf(: '-I Red'~ pelceplion of Blue COAs under replicatIOn 2 of case R3-EI 
r RED'S PERCEPllON OF BLUE COAs l RED GROUND TRLJTl-l COf> 3 
FIgure ~ Red', perception of Bille (,OA6 under replicatIOn 1 of case R3-E I 
.A..notherlllteresting pattern In the perceptIOn data IS that pnol to 
AT R('c'~ pen.epllDn of thc probabihty that Blue 15 followmg eOA J rises sharph to 
<iI:-rWq 1 C. then ldlls Ofn.>Clween dav ... 35 and --+ 5 tu a v,lluc d()~cr t(1 that oCthe other 
CO.l.,. pel cepillms Thl~ 1\ i!ltere~\ing due to tht fd.C"t that Pfl(1r to AT thC"re IS veT', lillie 
\.?r"und ITI(l\Cmcnt on Blue's part from \\hlcl1 Red CJI1 llIa)"e ilJudgrncnl regd.ldmg Blue, 
I egL:iarltv) snould achieve such a high prubabllity 60 Cd.rh m the scenano 11 IS nO! kno\\r. 
J,hlS I, merelv d result of the Baye~lan update, for Ihe eOA probab1lmes, O! 1ftlll" 
(2) Bille Lmr\ Case 2 \\'Ith ~ntl} case:: th~ SJITlC pattern of 
Red"., perception of Bille CO·\ 3 escalating to approxJmatcl;.- I (J cXlsted The time d[ 
\~hll.:h Red first correctlv idennf\ Bluc's Intend cd eOA (if IT e\cr made that identilication) 
fluctudlni ,lightly over the Red COAs, but was tYPically at day 7 (1 Note that although 
lhemillal :dcntifi(;~tlon happentOd at thiS time the length ofwnc In willch Red held 
lL11~ per~l:pll(Ln w.t_ qulle ilmlted (appro\lln<lteh (, hours In most cascs) 
Compared to emn case I (m \\I11Ch th~ average tlmiO untJllmtiai 
corrcct Idellufh;,Hlorl of Blue's eOA VIas approXllJlately dai' 7 5), thiS mdrcates that thiOrc 
ITId\ be a shght dlsadvantdgc to the late entry ofna\oal forces mlo the theater This 
obser\allon has valrditv In that if Ked knOVl~ that Blue has Ius full array of forces In 
lhc~ter, ReJ cannot rule out am forctO option tha!IS Within Blue's capablht\ For example 
f Reel that dll of Bille's navallor,:es me In theatel pnol 10 AT. Rood does Ilot b]()\~ 
I:' Hille Will aCllldliv execute an amphibIOus landing, but he cannot dl~COl1nt the possibJ!lt\o 
(thl, dilemma I~ the defimng lea~on for the amphibIOus femt) See Reference [IZ] for a 
complete ~et oi'grapilsfor entl"\ case::: 
(J) Blue Entry Ca~e:; A~ with entf'. cases 1 and 2, Red forcc~ 
seemed to be unable tu accuratel\' Identlf,. Blue's intended rOA IJl thi~ SLcnano It \~ould 
., Je,u1leo In the lea~t amount ohllne that Red correct]; 
Idelll.ftd Blu~, (0)\ O,eJ f\tntO lUll' oCtile sccndnp (three rcpll~atlons 01 edeh oj the 
three Red COA~) Red corroocth Identlfiood Blue's COA only n,lCe Both of thc~p ca,f'o 
IJI\O!,cd Red ll'>lng COA I and Blut' u,lflg eOA I dlong "Ith emry case I. and botll oj 
the,oo IIlCldents \\ele les~ than SI\ hour, In duration flgurc (, demonstr:l.le~ ReJ'~ 
l'ercepllc1I1 of the different Blue mtended dctl0ns for each urlhe three Red CO/\5 
figure (, Red's perc('ptlon of I1lue (,OAs under case~ R l-F1. R:::'-E3, R3-E3 
Overall COA conC/u.~ion.~ 
It appears that in all entry cases there is a significant level of confilslon on 
Red', pan In term~ of deterrmmng which eOA Blue IS pursumg \\'hile It IS no! clear that 
the entry cases ale the cause of the confuSion, It i, a possibdlty It IS clear. however, that 
lilt enlr\ of 11a\o,il force, does not affect Blue's perception of Red's CO.'\.. as It should not 
Given the possibility that naval forces are successfully mfluencm~ Red's 
perceptltlll of Blue ~ eOA, then it dppedrs to be to the advantage of the theater 
comll1andel to eXell.lSe entr) cases 1 or J in order to capitahze fully on thiS confi.I~lOn 
rnh ~onclU~lon. In dddlllOIl to belllg supponed by the output ofthe EETUvf fUnS. is 
reasonabl\ \Jild when comluenng the real world fle>;lbillt\ of naval forces III thl~ type of 
\,lRC cnVI:onment 
D, 1\10£ <\r .... AL "SIS 
~elcctllJllllr;\10Es 
Five issues were ldcntlfied dSrOt!;ntlal measUI!;sofeflectl\Cnessiorlhl,anaIYSb 
Th<o~e \10[', were selected ba~ed 00 the as~umptlon that they would be high pnorllv 
ISSUC~ for 'itralcglc planners 'When determming which contingcnc) pl~o to utilize ill a \1Re 
scenal h) The~e tlVl;' ~10E~ are merel:\- lepresentative of the possible Issues Ihat coula he 
Il.k:l[lfl~d il~ C[ltlea] h~ future U~l:r~ ut[hls model, and do no[ l<:,pre~<:'TI( a Wffiplcte listll1g 
"fnflOilly concern~ In additIOn to the graphICal anajysis(;onducted m this secliorJ a more 
nglJrnU' dJlalVS1S of MOl: ') wdl be peli'ormed for demonstratl"!; purposes only ,\~ st~ted 
dl the begmJllflg of tillS (;haptcr tnl~ thC51S IS attemrtingto demon~trdt<: EETllvls potential 
1'01 nnwc usc - not conduct a statistical analysIs ofns output data 
.tlOE! 
MOE, I, th~ pel cent ot'"urYl\'mg na\al umb This \10E IS hlol,.en OOWI1 
n1(1 tl,c ,ui,-'dOEs accordmb' to ~lllp lvpe (e g, Camels, Cruiser,Destroyers, ell) 
• Blul.' -\ircraft Carn~IS HI~toncallJ the aircraft (;dmef ha~ been 
con~ldcrl:d the high \alue unn m a naval battie group, so it is a~sumed that 
[llannel" wdl place high strategic value on the survivability of these ships 
• llllw Clu,~el~ and D~slro,els ICRlmES) Wah the ad"ent of the 
Tomah~v,.J.. crUl~e IIlIS\II~ th~ CRUDES ~hlp, In a bdltie group have 
• Rlue A.rnpil1blOliSShlPS SUKethcpnnClplemlS\IOlillfthen<L\<Lltoru's 
III a littola! enVlfonnlcnt" the ~Upr(lrt of the ground campmgn, the safely 
ot lIle alllphlbklU~ J.\~dult t(lrd:~ ,hould be a high pnor1l\ III theater 
pl,mnlnf 
• Red SAG I ships RapId attrition ofthe larger CRUDES type ships of 
the reu fleet wIll obvlOusl) minImize lo.,~cs to Blue forces and thu~ rna) be 
eon~ldered a~ a \10E 
uflheatCI plan, (111 the attrltlOll of the smaller mi~sile buat threats of the 
ships m Red SAG~ 
The value~ for MOE I are computed as follo'ws 
JfOE 2 
(25) 
MOE 2 I, the pel cent ofsurvlYmg comhat stlength of the naval forccs 
The current pulley ofthc Lnited States Armed Forces is to be able to respond to 1\\0 
l\1RCs happenmg m d1fferent theaters ncar!) sImultaneously Accordmgl), It may he 
de'lfdble to cOll~lder the strength ofthe surviving naval forces at the end of one .MRC so 
t"l,!t c,tlmatc, of their abill1) to contribute to a pos~lhle second.MRC can be computed 
Due to the vast d1fference" In what con~tltute~ "combat stTenb<th" hetween 
tlw C\'BG and ATG unll~. three types of thIs MOE weTe selected and theIr combat 
~lrenglh defined as lollov.s 
• Biue ('VBG Combat ~trength I., defined a, the number of rrussile battcnes 
lemamlflg An .lrgument rna; be mdde tholt the combal contributlOn of the 1\110..-41 
\ L~ Idunche~ I, !M gre.lt¢:- than thaI of the Mk-13 laun..:her SVS1C'm but for 
purpo,e~ ()flhl~ the~" they are counted d, eqllal~ fhe "lrcnglh of the C\'BG 111 
te1n1, ofremallling aircraft I~ addrcs~ed Idler 
• Fl:ul' A"r (j Dul' f() the prm;ar,.. ITlI\\]()n of the amphIbIOUS as~ault group, their 
cmYih.lt ~l!ength \.', defined dS the Yiumhel of\1arrne troops emharked Once these 
lro,)p~ an: dr,charged via amphrhlOUS Lmdrng Ihe, become asset'i of the ground 
romponenl o'mmander and the "comhat pOlenual" oflhe ATG i~ redu!.:!.:d (r e 
lhl:ll ':ombat potential has ahead~ been uulized) 1 helefclle, to be i",On~idered 
useliJl to a second thealci staffthn must havc Marine,; on bo~rd and leadv for 
dl.:p'O\lllent at the end of the til<;t lI.1RC 
• Rcd Llnlb (ombdt stlength of Red naval rorces IS defined In teJln~ of 
the mlmber of rrns~ile launchers I emaming 
:\10E ~ IS calculated as follows 
MOI::~ - (26) 
,HOE 3 
'v10F -' mea~ure.., the combat strenh'1h of Blue rclall've to Rcd n~\'al f01ces 
nll' \ueng!h Ta!io calculated for the thJee l-ategones of forces and defmition~ (lfcombat 
stl el1ph de~~nhcd for MOE 2. may be ofmte!eSI to the st!ateglc planner when 
conslderrng the felalln~ amount of damage Blue IS wllhng 10 mcur versus the amount of 
attrltlor lTlf1!cled on Red Destruction or'all of Red's naval combat potential \~Ith a 
Itsultll1g I()~s ()r50~o of Blue naval combat strength may nOl be acceptahle to a theate; 
C0I11m,mJeJ d~ I'D: example he Isconeemeo about publIC rCBe1lOn to the 10" of" I~rgc 
numr.e. u:~ ,hlj)~ The ,alue for MO[ ') b calwiatcd "s 
I Rcd "lfl:ng\h al end of ~~enarl(~ \ 
<, Red strength at stJrt of SCen3IlO) 
tL MOJ::4 
fhe percent ofsurvlI:mg mrcrafl a\atlable to the theater Lommandel atlhe 
COllclU<;lOn of cumbdt Thl~ measure of combat strl:ngth nut onlv cover<; the combat 
pr>:entlfll u: ;he :mcr,lft carners mr wmg. but also the strength 01 the ground hased L S 
A.ll Force piane~ <I, ""ell Consequently. MOE 4 IS measured in term' ufboth auack and 
fightel aIrcraft tOI blue naval and USAF plane~ as well as for Red air forces When 
E[TL.:v1matures to the pUll1t that ASV\' ,ll1d aIrborne C3 a~se!s are modeled. then this 
MOE may be expanded to include such alfnaft a~ the S-3 anJ £-2 f01 hlue naval falces. 
and the E-3 AWACS t01 USAF squadrons Note that for purpo~es of tIll') analYSIS the 
I~ Lon~jdered to be an atldck aircraft. even though It IS m realitv a dual 
fighter'Jttack pi<lne Addmonall~, (he los~ of an atrcraft carner tesuits In th", loss of Its 




MOE 5 IS the strength of ground forces An analYSIS of the effect of naval 
I"lce, Of] conflict outcome 111 a littoral warfare envlronment would he incomplete wlthom 
,ornL' C()n~ecllon!(l thc grOllnd campaign results Arcordlllflv, the ,(rength oflhe ground 
!vICt" rllea\uled a, the pel cent of per~onnei ~llrviving the C,llltllCt IS used as a !\fOE for 
thl"lhc'>i\ It h nut Intended t() conduct a tnorough anaiV<;15 ofEETL "1'<; modeling ('f 
~r(lund '~arl'lre here. hut rather to qllilntifv the effect ofna'val force~ on ground ~ornl)dt 
\lore complete analYSIS ot the ground campmgn mdy be found In Reteren-.:e [91 MOE 5 
IS computed m il ~lmllar fa~hion.is 1\10I::s I and :::! 
MOE 5 = 11 ground troops at end of scenario 
# of ground troops at Start of scenario 
(29) 
2, Results 
The results of the data analysis performed on EETLM output are discussed in this 
section. As stated previously, the intent is to detennine whal effect (if any) the entry case 
utilized by the nava l forces has on the outcome of the conflict as measured by the above 
defined MOEs. The results are discussed by MOE initially, with a combined discussion of 
the results and the conclusions drawn from them at the end of the section. Graphic 
illustrations are included as necessary to clarity the analysis, with a full set of graphs and 
data tables provided in Reference [12] 
MOE 1 
(1) Blue CVs Based on the data, there was a more noticeable 
difference between the effects of entry case on the attrition of blue CVs than on any other 
blue naval asset. Specifically, the best case for carrier attrition was under entry case I, as 
can be seen in Figure 7. When averaged out over the three Red COAs, entry ease 1 
produced the most favorable value ofCV attrition 
Figure 7. Survival fate for Blue CVs 
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The difference between MOE values under entry case I and entry 
case 2 is ~mall (approximately! I %), but this is due to the fact that Blue had only two 
carriers and never lost more than one in any given scenario run. Based on these values, 
Blue could consider it 83% likely Ihal they will nOI suffer the loss of an aircraft carrier if 
they utilize entry case 1 Compared to the 77% likelihood if they pursue entry case 3 and 
the 72% likelihood under entry case 2, a theater commander may consider looking for 
more compelling indications from the other MOEs rather than decide based on CV 
attrition alone 
(2) Blue CRUDES Figure 8 demonstrates that the attrition of the 
CRUDES ships in the Blue CVBG was not significantly different under any of the three 
entry cases. For all three entry cases and all three Red COAs, slightly more than half of 
the CRUDES ships survive the conflict 
I GRAND ME~~~= FOR MOE11 
Figure 8. Survival rate for Blue CRUDES ships 
While cntry casc 2 yielded a slightly higher MOE value (056 versus 
0.54 for entry cases I and 3), the difference is not of ~uch a magnitude that a reliable 
recommendation regarding which entry case to utilize can be made 
It should be pointed out that the attrition rates for the CRUDES 
ships is probably unreali~tically high Given that Blue forces are not facing mine or 
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<;uhman:le v>Ufdft It W<1.' expeC1td 1hd! more CRUDES ~h!DS would sun'lVe the e()[]fhct 
rhl.> dl~propomonatel~ high casualty rate IS beiJeved to be a result ofthe BJrtle Darnafrt' 
>\~S6sment I RDA) algorithm dIscussed In Chapter 1\, Once a mOle robust BDA 
a'f!OJlthm IS 111 place, It IS bdlewd that these anntion rates will more closely reHeet reaht\ 
(3) Blue AmphibIOus Ships Blue amplnhl(lus ~hlpS sho\\ed a 
much 11I)o'.h(,1 d,trltlc\n ral~ lilar. dllj a[l~ othe! blue naval Units (,ee FIgun' 'l) This v..a<; nOI 
une.>.pected given the BD/\. algorithm dl~cu~~ed ab[)ve and the fact that amphibious shIp" 
arc armed \-'Ith only the mOSI ba~lC ~ejf-defense weaponry [t should not he surpTlsmg 






bgure Sf 'Survl\al rate for Blue Amphlblou~ slllp'i 
Based on the value of MOE I for blue amphIbious sillps 11 appear, 
Clltwr en1r\ ca~e t,,(\ or thtee IS destrable, bUI a~ WIth the ('KUDES shtps, there I, 
1Il5uf!:iCll'nt dltTerenee between the three entr,' ca\l;~ upon which to base a deCi~lOn 
\-1) Red ~ <\(j I Ship, The ~hip~ of Red SA.G J. consl~tlllg oflhe 
!lea\I';:, and velte! armed Sovtet-era \\arshtps. demonstrated the tnO~t anntl(j[] when blue 
t~lrce, Llulw'o entry rase three There WilS only a very sltghl dlffelence betwecn thc losse~ 
l!lcurred hy Ked under Blue emf\, c<lse 3 (77";' of SAG I ~hip~ ~urvlVin.f!) as compdred to 
entf\,' c:a,c nne (lOG 0 101 case t\\U (86"'o).and onh a y% difference between the best and 
(,I 
\\Ol~t ca~c Siluations These results arc shown In FigUie 10 :-';ote that since we ale 
anal\l;ng the~c dat~ from the perspeclIvc of the Rlue wmrnander. tht most deSIrable entT)-
C:~'L I, the one that produces the smallest \fOf \'alue for Red 
figure 10 Survival rdle for Red SAG I ships 
,\n interesting aspect of the attntlOn data for all slup types, but 
most particularly I'm 1112 shlps In Red SAG I, IS the vanablhty of the levels ofatliltlon 
Ovel thc different Rtd (OA<; Smce the naval force~ do not folJt.m wldd; dlfferent 
c()urse~ over the ,anous COAs, It was not antlclpated Iha! there would be a lalge amount 
of,ar,ance (wer Inc MOE I.'a!ue~ The fact that there IS such v,mabdlty In the oukomes 01 
the scena!lO replicatlom eITIrhaslze~ the stochastic nature ofthe mode! Consider Figures 
II. L'_. Jnd I'. \\hJ.:h show, SAO I attritIOn for each of the three Red COAs when 
Figure II. Survival rate of Red SAG I ships under Red eOA I 
I
I PCT OF RED SAG 1 SURVIVORS I 
I RED COA 2 , 
~ "'[Jl~  0.6 II :=:: ~I~ :: II ~ENmY CASE~ I 
* o 
lAvER,o.GEDOVER3REPLICATloNS! 
Figure 12 Survival rate of Red SAG I ships under Red eOA 2 
PCT OF RED SAG 1 SURVIVORS 
I 
I ' 
Figure 13 Survival rate of Red SAG I ships under Red eOA 3 
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Bd~cd on the data represented in Figures J 1, 12 and 13, II would 
apped! that a deCl~l\<: dd\,mtage exists tfBlue can asccrtdm Red'~ mtended COA PfiOl to 
Illa]"mg the de,:!c,I(Hl ,lr. when \0 commit naval force,; For example If Red wa~ known to 
bt' pUrSl!!ng 101 could be f(Heed Into punumg) then COA. L then 1\ would definltciy be to 
Glue's advantage to commil naval force~ on t!Tne under entr\, case :< S!1lce Red suffers an 
a\eJage or 50"/0 ed~ualtie~ m this SltUdtlon Alternal1~elJ irll \\ia, behe\ ed th3\ Red "ould 
10110'-' their COli, 2. Blue'~ optimal mo\c would bew commit rorc,es lo the theater ea[b, 
undel Cd.se 1 and agam calise Red to lose halfofthe!f hca,,!cr warsh!p~ 
(~) ReG SAG:: Ships Rec SAG::: shIps mdlcated the mOSl 
d<:Cl~lve ad\anuge fOI entry cast: L With an estnnatt:d sUr\lval rale of 5°°'0 (I C d Im~ of 
41 00 of R("d's mlS~lIe boat forces) TIllS result can be seen m Figure 14 When compared 
to the survl\al ratt:6 of entry ca~cs 2 and 3 (8."% and 74%, respectlvei\), it can be ~een 
that d Sllb~lanlml advantage eXists In gettmg naval combatants in theater early based 011 
this MOE 
hgure 14 Survival rate of Red SAG 2 slnr.' 
/\nclltellldtlvt:\\avwo:onSlcierthl<;dataistu a,sumethattbt' 
theater comm(lnuer ha~ no control over the ent!) ca;,e under ",hlch the naval force~ will 
operate The theater commander'~ area ofrcsponslblllt) may be the ~econJ MRC in the 
1\\0 'vlRC ,;cenarl(l for e"\.dmplc. and the arrival of naval and MPS a~set5 arc dcpendem 
lipan the piog:re~s of the fir~l MRC and hm\ much fOIce can he diverted mto the theater 
III !Ill', ~Illla:lon, a thedter stdA' may \\I-,h to cunSlder the expened level of damage Blue 
fo,ce~ Cdll mIl,et upon Red naval unJ\~. dependent upon thl" COli. that Red chooses It can 
11" assumed that the most nkel] time of arrival for naval forces to the second oftwo ~1RCs 
l~ entry ca~e 2 (late arm'ai of naval forces) By utihzing the claw in Figures 10 and 14. the 
Blue ~tafr .::all estullate that navallos~es to Red umts will be appro:>..imately 15 % ( th~ 
complement \)1 the cumomed survIval rate of approxImately 85°~) 
Tins value assumes also that Blue has no pnor Idea ufy"hlCh CUA 
Red '.vil. ]lur~ue lfttns l~ not true and Blue eIther know,> \\hat Red will do with some 
l<:v(;'1 of ..:onfiuence, or can exert some Iype of pIes sure through other channels 
thdt WIll cuerce Red into selecting a partIcular eOA then by utiliLlng Figures II, 12, 
13 tor SAG 2 III ~onjuncllon wIth the Jata fur SAG I found in Reference [I~]. morc 
SD(,Clth' c~tlmate" can he otTered This type of' what-If' analYSI~ may prove to be a 
\dludole "s~e( 10 ~Liff dnalyst~ when iactd wllh situations III whIch control over the 
?-HI,al (,f Jorces can not be considered a guaranteed commodllY 
(6) O,crali ConclusIOn Based on the MOE valul;s from thc sub-
c~leg['r:es dls('us~ed abo\e, no partIcular vanant of MOE I provlde~ H clear conclusIon 
frOIll .. ,hlcli to make a recommendatilln Thl, ."hould not he ~urpfl<;mg, smce thep: o.oe~ 
art howen'l certall1 ob~ervJtlOns thm Cdn be rnad~ m ()]uer to aid III the strategiC 
plannmg process 
• Emrv case 2 offer<; n0 slgl1lticant ad\alllage~ for any sub-caregol) ot \,10E , 
• Enll) I and; are equall\' demable in tcrm~ ofMOF I Entry case I 
ma'aml.7.e~ the sUf"lval of the Blue carner, whllc rnaxlllHzmg the damage to the 
Red rllls~lIe hual thrcdt, whlle cntry "a.'e] jield, the lughest sUf"lval late for the 
amplllblOw, forces willie mfhctmg the greatest damage to Red's CRUDES forces 
:140£2 
(1) Blue CVBGs Aircraft ,arner battle group strength \Va, not 
sl,f!nificallth dtfectcd b\ changes in the elltrv case utilized by Rlue or bv the \'ariou~ (0,\, 
l'mployed by Red Over three rephcat!Om for each of the entt) cases and eGA 
combrnallons, Blut:' rVBG strength 'val led by no more than 5~'" ThiS conSIant sm'vl\ai 
rate, summ<lnzed m 'J ahle 2 and ~hown graphICally in Figure 15, indICates that Blue 
C\-SG ~trength I~ not a useful MOE for deCiding which entry case to utilize 
1 able:2 Remammg Combat Strength for Blue C\'~ per Case 
Figure 15 Average remaining combat strength for Blue CVBGs 
(2) Blue ATGs. Amphibious strength varied somewhat between 
entry cases and COAs in the individual scenario runs, but when averaged over the COAs, 
the Impact of any given entry case on amphibious strength was diminished . Overall, 
however. entry case 2 (arrival of naval forces after the perceived attack time) 
demonstrated the highest utility. with entry case 3 only slightly less desirable on the 
average. as can be seen in Figure 16 
I I GRAND MEAN VALUES FOR MOE21 
J 'r;;]"""'" ~" ~ '.' I-"""''''SE' I ;e O~ _ENTRVCASE 2 0 2 _ ENTRVCASE3 
, 
, 
I ... VE RAGE OOVER 3 co .... I 
Figure 16 Average remaining combat strength fo r Blue ATG s 
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This result supports what would be intuitively assumed about the 
outcome of the MOE val ues. It was considered likely that the arrival of forces at the 
perceived attack time would be equally desirable as the arrival offorces prior to attack 
time. since the forces would spend roughly the same amount of time engaging the enemy 
forces and thus would be expected to suffer similar casualty rates. It was also anticipated 
that the arrival of forces after attack time (entry case 2) would be considered to be more 
desirable than entry cases I or 3. Since forces under entry case 2 spend less time in a 
hostile environment. it was pre-supposed that their casualties would be lessened and thus 
the MOE values would be maximized 
(3) Red Naval Units. Red naval unitS' MOE values were also quite 
close together (approximately a 6% difference between the most and least desirable entry 
cases), and the pattern that the results exhibited also fit the preconceived assumptions 
discussed in the previous section. as is shown in Figure 17 
Figure 17 Average remaining combat strength for Red naval units 
As is apparent from Figure 17. there is not a large difference 
between the entry cases in terms of the damage inflicted upon Red's combat potential 
However, this graph does show that entry case 2 is the most favorable to Red, with cases 
I and 3 being the most favorable to Blue, This result makes intuitive sense due to the fact 
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[halm entr-. case::: th..: Blue force~ ,lie Unl\lllg after ((milK! hc:gm, Ihu~ hd\mg 1<:\, time: 
mthe scenariO to engage (lnu allme I{cu'~ t()rCL~ In entry Lase, ] and J, Blue f{)]ce~ an: 
mtheateI at the commencement ofhostliltie~. therefore thev arc able to mflll,;t damage on 
Red i(lfces to: the longe'ir period, of time Thl\ would re~ul! mthe ()h~erveu outcume 
Irl\h:J \10E::: ,alue, for entll Cdses I and':; and hIgher values tOi entry ca,e 
(.:J) Overall ('()nclu~lOn~ Baged on the dalil preseTlted for MOE:: 
1:1 the sectIOn, ailme, the only conclusIOn that can be offen:d Islhat cnt[\ case::: Ol1~I" nl' 
HrateglC ad\antage In term,,> (lfthe attnllon uftumhal strength Entry ..:ase~ ] and, both 
prllduc:<: SlHllla! \fOE \alues, and the theater commander must rel\ on ~ome other 
In;lu<:nLlllg [J.c':m Hl moe! 10 deCIde between the~e TWO entf) case optJons 
,\.fOE 3 
I') Blue CVBGs MOr: 3, defined as the raIlO of Blue's stren.gth 
w Red ~ strength and computed as 111 Equation (27), produced re~ul!s very ~mtilar to those 
ofMO[:::: \\ hen m~dsureO III terms of the number ofsh)p~ remaining, entrY cases 1 and 3 
c~eJe the prelerred options \\lth emf)' case I bemg the most desirable From Table ,_ It 
lilli ~'e SC1.'n that (he m;UEIIl (1{~urenonty fm cntry case I WdS (lpprOXIJll~tely ]0°;' over 3 
16"0 over cmr\ d re~ult that further surrort~ th~ pre(.once)vcd ~l1)tudes 
uhcu\<;ed m the pr('\,lo\l~ SC('tlon 
======_"'JIl' -:-'~G I I BLLEA TG I 
___ --=-="-'--'-'"H"')u~",___lI___",,'_''''"H'C'h'__,- nw~ J 
I 
'j able 3 i\1OE 3 Values fOl Blue C\'BG, and A1G, 
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HO\\eVeI,llIsunclem If the dIfference bl:lween emrv case I and3 
L" slgnIT-lcam. (11 It II ,<; mereh the result of land am cnance' In orci<:r to a~certalll If enH) 
case I IS mde",d the pleferred optiOn. a closer look IS warranted C()n~equentl). anahsl~ 
Wd'; cunducted III Oldel to detenmne lfthere IS indeed any sIgnificant differcno;,c bct\\l:en 
cntr. case I 3nd entry case 3 In terms of MOE 3 To tlus end. the followll1g de~cnptlve 
,t~tlstlcswere' computed 
Statistic Entn/Case I Ent Ca~c3 
:\lean 09R8333 (J 881969 
Standard Error 0072347 0042:'6" 
Standard D('viatioll I 021704 0127694 
Sam Ie Variance 0047lOtJ 0016-,08 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistles for MOE 3 (Blue CVBG Shlp~) 
Frl'lll Tdbles 4 It can be ,een that, \\hIle the mean values I' OJ entf"\ 
I and 1 aH~ different by a margm of 10%, the relatl\ely large values of the standard 
~rfC\: and ~ample standard deviatlOn draw mto question the slgmiicam;c of an) ddTercncc 
In Incal1\ be-tween til{' entry cases In fact, a 95% confidence intef\.'al for the mean vaiues 
that entr:- ca~e I may actually be between 0 846537 and I 130129 As tillS 
confidence IIlterval cr,vel()re~ the mean valuf.: of entry case 1.llls eyen more qUi;'stlOnabie 
tliat th~rc I, J ,IallS\lcdll, ~Ignlfi(;~nt dlfierence between entrv cases I ~nd 3 
~ub~quenlh Studcm', 1-test WdS conducted In order to establish the degree to \\illCi1 
there IS an ad,antage III ~electlJlg entrv ca~e I (for ttll~ the,l, all t-te~I, dfe t\\(Haileil test::. 
i"f the dlf'1.'erer;,:c b~t,,'een mc::ans not a%ummg equa' Vanil.lleeS) TillS test re\ealed tile 
foiio'hln", 
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Observed t value 1.266924 
t-Critical 2.160368 
value 0.22741 
Table 5 T -test values for MOE 3 (Blue CVBG Ships). 
Thus it cannot be said that entry case 1 produces significantly more 
favorable results than entry case 3 when measured in terms of the ratio of Blue ships 
remaining relative to Red 
Similarly, when the remaining strength is measured in terms of 
combat equipment, the results are not conclusive. At first glance, it appears that entry 
case 3 is the preferred option for Blue to pursue. However, the margin of preference is 
merely 2.5% over entry case 1 and 4% over entry case 2. When sUbjected to Student's t-
tes!. it can be determined that the difference between entry case 1 and entry case 3 is not 
significant to any reasonable level of confidence. Consequently, this data does not provide 
suppon for any of the entry case options under Blue's consideration. 
(2) Blue ATGs. The data supported the same general results for 
the amphibious task groups. Entry case 3 demonstrated a fairly large margin of 
superiority over entry cases 1 and 2 (as can be seen in Table 3), panicularly when 
measured in terms of combat equipment remaining. In this category, entry case 3 was 
10% more favorable than entry case I, but only slightly more than 2% more so than entry 
case 2 When Student's t-test was used in order to determine ifthe 10% difference 
between entry cases 1 and 3 was significant, the following results were produced 
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Observed t value -1.10795 
t-Critical 2,306 
value 0.300 
Table 6 T-test values for MOE 3 (Blue ATG Equipment) 
As can be seen from Table 6, there is no significant difference 
between the results of entry case I and entry case 3 in terms of this MOE 
d. MOE 4 
(I) Blue USN Fighter Aircraft, The data for the aircraft attrition 
rates demonstrated the most variability of all the MOB. For Blue naval aircraft, the 
presumption was that in entry case I and 3, the aircraft attrition rating would be the 
highest due to the fact that all scripted air strikes scheduled during hostilities would be 
executed. In entry case 2, some of the air strikes would be canceled by the model's 
algorithms since the time of arrival would have been after the scripted time of the strike-
thus no strike would occur and no loss of aircraft would be experienced. 
As seen in Figure 18, entry case I provided the most desirable 
MOE value for the Blue USN fighter aircraft when averaged over the three possible Red 
eOAs The benefit of entry case I was also clearly demonstrated when considered over 
each of the Red eOAs 
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IAVER .... GEDOVERJCO ..... ' 
Figure 18. Average survival rate of Blue USN fi ghters 
It is dear from Figure 18 that entry case I provides the most 
desirable MOE values when Red pursues eOA I or 3, \\Then averaged over aU three 
possible Red eOAs, entry case I becomes the dominam option for Blue to pursue 
(2) Blue USN Attack Aircraft. The pattern of attrition 
demonstrated by Blue USN fighters is very closely followed by the rates of attrition of 
Rlue L!SN attack aircraft This pattern is shown in Figures 19, 20 and 21 
iI PCTOfUSN .... -:~ .... ~SlJRVlVlNG l 
Figure 19 Comparison of survival rates for Blue USN attack and fighter aircraft under 
RedCOA I 
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Figure 20 Comparison of survival rates for Blue USN fighter and atlack aircraft under 
RedCOA2 
I pCTOFUSN :::~SUR"NlNG I I l pCTOFUSNA~~"';TSURVI"1NG 1 
1 : 50:~ I:=:~q , ~H := ~:~ 
._~~, ! ~ "" .~~ ~a, 
, I I, " " 
I·" .... "DOV •• ' ••• U''''''ONSI I IA:E ..... omo"".' .... """"ONS! 
Figure 21 Comparison of survival rates for Blue USN attack and fighter aircraft under 
RedCOA3 
(3) Blue USAF Aircraft. Overall , the U.s. Air Force experienced 
the largest attrition of all the services This observance is attributed to the simple fact that 
USAF aircraft presence in the theater was independent of both Red COA and Blue entry 
case option Since the Ajr Force aircraft were in theater for the full duration of host ilities 
regardless of the conditions of the scenario. it is not unexpected that they show a higher 
average attrit ion rale than Ihe US Navyaircraft The one interesting aspect ofBJue 
USAF aircraft attrition is thai il follo ws Ihe same basic pattern as the Blue USN ai rcraft 
Refer to Reference [ 12J for a complete set of graphs depicting Red aircraft attrition 
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.lfOE 5 
\fOE S demonstluted tile most clca: cut me,ISllre: ufdf(;'ctlvC"ne~s orall 
\lULs cho,en fl\f ,hi, thl.";I, The mleTe~lmg aspect of the data gathered from .\10E 5 l~ 
the: apparent ~yJ11J11etry ber,\eel1 Blue gtound force attritmn and Red force attntlon It IS 
Jppurent from lhts MOE that there b an ad\'amage to Bluc utllizmg ent1\- CJ~f::; If 
ma;>,.llnllmg rhe SU1\-'I\,Ll ofl3lue grDund fmce~ l.ind Gon<"equentiy maxlmlLmg the attrl\lon 
orRed ground lutces)IS deslrI;d C on~lder the result~ of the dald rlln~ for Blue a.nd Red 
,,,""Oco'",,-='c· .... I___ _ 
Ilgurc 22 A\cragc ~ur\l\al rat~~ for Blue and Red ground forces 
hom these graphs, It IS appment that entr, case 2 I~ the best option for tile 
DI'1e comm.imJer to rake ThiS result, while slipponed by the numeJl(::al resulh. j, counter-
mtUltl\C 11 doe, not make sense from an operational standpoint that thetr \\uuld be a 
subst~ntl.ll .idvant<lge 1!I deplovUlg forces to a combat scene late ThiS IS the POInt at 
which Ine plofe,sloI1Jlludgllle"nt uftbe analyst would cOllle mto p.uv IftaKeJl at 
,alJc tht' ue~I"I()n [lIIght be made to deplov forces bte III order tll ma;>,.11lllZe tilt' \alllt;' oj 
\10[ ~ \\ iltic thiS v.uulrJ nlllmmZe eXjJl1suHo ofHlllt' f0rCt:~ to hO~tlil1ll's and mH111ll1/e 
('a,\1altHo, It would most hkelv not be the best strmeglc derlSlOli fOJ a theater c01llmande: 
tl'mJ.ke EETL'vL like all other combat Illudeb. IS an aid to deCision makers - not i'. 
rcplJ..:emcntfolthem 
f OverallJHOE conclusion. 
As a summar} to thl: l\10E anal,,~Is. It would be hdpfullll conSIder Table 
4 V.hl.;h summan7e the most desirable entry ca<;e option as do:tefmmed by the vanous 





Table 7 Summary of optimal entry case optIOn per MOE 
Not\.' that smce onl;,' MOE 3 was subjected to in depth analysis, thiS 
c()n~IUSlon IS nO! presented as a statistical sTudy, but merely a demonstration of fETLM~ 
C\~1ilbi!lt:es In fael due to the plemature status ofEETLM as a model. II can be 
presumed that most of the :viOEs do not mdlcate statisl1call) ~ignificant preferences fOl 
~he dlflerent entry ca~e, FOI demonstratIOn purposes, however, It can be saJd that based 
un [he compan~()n ufthe mean data value~ prOVIded by the EETLM runs and the MOE~ 
Spccltlcd entrY ca~es I or 2 provide a simIlar degree of de~lrabiht:'r Since It IS not 
cOIl'.ldeled realistic to assume [hal wltholdmg force~ to lhl; ~cene ofcombal rq <l 
Sclaleglcall\ sound course ofacllOn, I: Cdn be concluded that entry Cd~e 1 (amval 01 Jla\dl 
dnd \1PS forcc~ pnol [0 the ,l,lrt of combat) IS the most dl;\lrahle force entry DptlOn 
VI. RECOMMENDA nONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. GENERAL 
As stated throughout this thesis. EETLM is in its developmental infancy It is 
acknowledged that due to a wide range of circumstances (including time and hardware 
constraints), not all of the desired aspects of theater conflict are incorporated into the 
EETLM architecture. It is also acknowledged that some aspects ofEETLM, specifically 
the Battle Damage Assessment algorithm, need to be refined and improved to provide a 
more accurate model of combat This chapter will discuss some of the major aspects of 
warfare that need to be incorporated into EETLM at future dates and will, when 
applicable. discuss the status of those updates that are in progress 
The source of these future incorporations are primarily: 
• The Early Entry. Lethality, and Survivability Battle Lab, U.S. 
Army Training and Doctrine Command, IT Monroe, Virginia 
• The Naval War College Wargaming Center, specifically from the 
author'S partiCIpation in the Global '94 Wargame Exercise 
B. FUTURE ADDITIONS TO EETLM 
1. Mine Warfare 
Mine warfare is becoming one of the most critical aspects ofnavaI warfare, 
particularly as the Navy transitions to the littoral combat environment. It is also, 
unfortunately. the one area of combat that the Navy tends to disregard at much too high a 
cost Within the last 10 years, three U.S. Navy warships have been severely damaged by 
mines fUSS Samuel B Roberts (FFG.58), USS Princeton (CG-59), and USS Tripoli 
(LPH-IO». The Samuel B_ Roberts was nearly sunk and the Princeton and Tripoli were 
forced to be removed from a theater of combat as the result of enemy mine warfare 
Mmes are a very cheap and effective means for a less technologically powerful foe to 
inflict significant damage on the U S. Navy with very little risk to themselves. and as such 
the area of Anti-Mine Warfare (AMiW) needs to be of prime concern to today's strategic 
planners 
Therc does not appear to bc any single model that integrates the effects of mine 
warfare on the outcome oftheatcr level combat. This is a deficiency that has significant 
impact when trying to address the issues of Strategic Sealift, delivery of Maritime Pre-
Positioning Ships for the U S. Army, and the execution ofamphibious assaults. The U.S 
Navy Mine Warfare Command utilizes a model called the Uncountered Mine Planning 
Module (UMPM) to assess the effectiveness of a minefield once laid, but this model does 
not interface with any other combat model, nor does it model enemy mine capabilities. 
Current practice is for the user to Ktranslate" enemy mines into equivalent U.S. mines and 
then utilize UMPM to determinerninefield effectiveness [Ref. 10] Ina wargaming or 
analysis situation, this result would have to be manually applied to the results of the 
theater combat, potentially degrading the statistical validity of the model's output 
EETLM has bcen designed to incorporate AMiW, although it is not currently 
modeled. The physical and transit nodes can be designated as having mines present, but 
there is no algorithm in place to date that models the effects of mine warfare At a 
minimum. the following characteristics of AMiW should be modeled 
• Density of minefield 
• Type of mine (i.c., acoustic, contact, etc.) 
• Effects of mine sweeping operations on known minefields 
• Hidden/unknown minefields. 
2. Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). while apparently declimng as an area of concern 
in some circles ofthinking, has not lessened in importance as the former Soviet Union 
fades farther into history. Many third world nations have invested in submarine 
technology, mostly that of the former Soviet Union For example, it is common 
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knowledge that Iran operates some SOVIet dIesel submarines, and l\orth Korea mamtams 
Ih O~'11 dIesel submarine fleet These art' simply two e"ample., ofpcllcntlall:' hostile 
L'():'lTltlle~ posing significant submarine threats It should be obvious that it is not in the 
LTIIled State's best interest Tl\ di,regard AS\V as we plan for future wars Two opriun;; 
in ml)deling AS\\' using EETLM incorporate the modelmg into the cunent ~urf:-lce 
nc'lwork, 0, create a ncw under,,,.-ater network 
The advantage of incorporating AS\\' into the existlllg ~urface nctwork is a SaYlIlgs 
il" computational compie>;:!t)'_ since there would blC no nt:ed for FETJ ,\'1 to keep tra;:\.. of a 
separah; sel ofphvsicJI and I.an~it n(lde~ during each update cydc ell-locating ASW into 
the SUrf:ICl" netwOJ k would require each transit and physi<.:al node to model en\'ironTllental 
conditi,)Jls rciating to a(;OUS11C rang!: predictions. pre~encc or ab~ence of convergence 
zOlle~ (CZsj, and estimated background noise levels in coastal are~s This modification 
cuilid ht: accomplished bv fixed user mplllc, I'm these \'alues into the ~ '\T£T datafile or an 
ll\(;rnall\ ~ meltl(1J be dey eloped. perhap~ through aCCt:~Slllg a databa~c of his tonca I 
enVllOTlITleIllal data and generating predIcted acoustic conditJons within the operating 
Creating a second. indepcndcnt underwater network would allo\\ for modeling the 
unique propcnie'> 0; acoustic propagation, sonar operations (both active and passive). and 
the IIltricitcie~ [)i'umlcrwJteT dett:ctlOn and comhat. It would also allow for modelmg of 
TlJ\al a;.:t;\'itic, is it high<::r threat ~llch a~ the convoy 01" troops and 
~Llp;)lie.<, to the theater of actioll, or 0p!:1l water submarine \'5 submalme set:narros While 
,t I, uncle.n th~ e>-.1en;:" "h,~h EETL\l's basiC ,trucI.lre would have to be' alte,cd iii 
\)[[kr to IlIU)rpOI a:e tbis third network, it docs appear 10 be well ",;thm EETL\fs 
':J.;Jabllnics to mod(;1 ASW as the mudel develop, 
J. Theater Hallisti~ Missile Defense 
TIH:atl:r Ballistic Missile Defense (TBl\ID) is yet another facet oftheatel \\arfar~ 
that is currently drawing significant attention from strategic planners Highlighted during 
th~ Gult"War. TB"MD is nu longer limited to Patriot missile battcries defcnding an area 
target Inbound SCl.D missilcs .. \EGJS cruisers aJld destr()ycr~. equipped with all 
lmp!"O\ed \ ersion of the Stanoard S~1-2 mls~ile and operating ellher llldependenth or In 
vw.junnion \Vltll Patriot. are nov. being utihled a~ a major TBi\ID a.,set As wah mine 
\\a~·fare. there IS no cmrent modcl that Incorporates thh aspect of combat 
'0hth the emergence of new teclmologies. it is imperative that combat mudd" 
~aj)\llr!; th!; advantagcs these technologies offcr to \var tighting commander~ \\'lth the 
addll,()n Ofthb a~pe(.:[ oftheater warfare. the followmg issue~ wuld be explored 
\\·h,\teq~1 tile de.mea measure (lfetTe~ti\"cne~s mil\" be It i~ Jl'pMent that thelt" aTC 
rilJ!Tl,·',lll' Slpliticanll'>Slle'i Il\ be addles~~d In Ihe field ofTheatt"r Ballistic- ,\'1J.~sde 
Defense EETLM has the potential fDr quanti!:!tlvcl)- addressing these Issues wah some 
modific~tions 
4. \\eapum ufl\1as~ Destruction 
With the' ctenllSc of the SOVI!;t Lilion. the threat of global nuclear war !la, 
dlmllllshcd Lnfortunatch tht"threal oflo ...... IC\·elnuciearexchangegha'not, a:;cvltknccd 
b, :he threat po<;ed today by '!orth Korea Addilionalh. the tl1fe.;t of chemical and 
bJOlogllal \\capOIl, bemg u~ed m the next conflict IS ofpressmg concern to today', milllary 
I tilE' fan th,ll ,;hemlcal \\eapons \\ere not used dunng the Gulf\\'ar surpn'ied lTlall) 
milnar. analyst:;} Weap()n~ of\I.l.~s De~tnlcl1on (\\'J\.1D), a telm enCOmpd%lIlg nuclear, 
.:h<:1l1Ical .;nd Lliological \.\ieap()Il~. dre typlCdll, modeled In a ~crarale proCl~S~ fiom 
tl~jdltllHldl combat models Dunng the Cold War era that approach wa~ acceptable smce 
the ~()un.e of the chemical/nuclear threat was established (J e , lhe SO'vlet LlllOn and 
\\ ar~d\" 1\H.:t) and the method of their employment was believed to be rea~onabl~' \\cJl 
kno\\ 11 SlIlce \\.\1D was con~ldercd less of a vanabk, lb contnbullon to the conflict 
...... .1~ o.;(1n.'.Idered eaSlel to quantl!} in telms of casualtIes and loss of combat potential Tlus 
a,"(1 tdLlhtated Its transferal to specJaI warganung cells where !ughel level poiJtlcai and 
,lrJ.teglC Issues could be resolveo and the "conventional" wargamers could concentratc on 
figntmg thewa! 
Present and futureeonilicts me shlouded in the potentIal use ()fchcmical and:ol 
nUde,\f weapolls with little or no warning Add1\lonally. these wcapon~ of mass 
de~lJuctlon will moslllJ...dy be used as a tool ofterroflsm or as a means ofald!llg a weaker 
mllll~1\ Jdlle\e ~ome level of panty ...... lth the II S force., A~ ~l1ch.lwo conciuslons can 
bc n:ached first Ihatlhe establlshec paradigms Jegardlllg the use ofW\ID mav not applv 
w future con!liclS "e':;,Jrld contmgellcv plan~ fo, W.\1D u,e b\ the enemv Jre gOing tu 
11.1\<' (r. bc addre,,<:d at lower le\!cI~ orthe natIOnal cham of <.:ommand Given lh:1t the 
'\;dllonal Command e\uthonty IlldV not be able co\cr all contlllgencles III a (J).;C\ ared oi 
rcspon~iblilh, illS deSirable that [ETLM have the capability to model the effects \V.\1D 
~. Hull's Of Engagement 
1 he must significant de<::lslon made by a theatel commander IS the Rulc~ uf 
1:.ngagement (ROE) he provides [or hIS subordwate forcc~ The gUldance provided by thl' 
ROE I'> \\hdt the f(m,;e~ In theater will u~e to determme the cnllcallssues of host tie lntenl 
hO\lIie action. and engagement cmena m vanou, le\els ofdefenSlyeioffenSI\e posture, 
Re"IL'" of I S nd,al activItieS in the Per~lan Gulf dUllllg Ibe ban-Iraq v.ar. speclfi~all\ 
lhe attack on the L'SS Stark (FFG- j I) bv an Iraqi F-l Mirage and the inadvertent 
d()\\nlng ufan Iranian CIVlhan alrhner bv the USS VlllceIlne~ (CG-49) dramati..;alh 
IIlllstrate the effect ROL can have on all levels ofU 5 operatIOns (both taclicaliy, 
srratel,ucall\, and poiltlcallv) 
A.na!vsis of the potential effects of ROE 10 dlf'ferent levcl~ of bu~t!li/le~ and m 
Llltlerenl ~cendnos should be ofpnme concern to theater level ~laffs By programming 
lnto l:.ETLM a series ot decislOn rules such that torces ""Iii follow a dlfferem set of ROE: 
under dlffenng levels ofpereelved1actual hostilities, analysts may be able to Invesllgate the 
dfectlveness oftheakr ROE The obvlou~ drawback to thi~ aspect ofmodehng IS that the 
deCl~IOJlS made by commanders under the rules of engagement ale so verv dependent on 
the IflJI'vldual commander's leadershIp style. hiS mterpretatlOn of the ROE, and hIS 
percepliOTI of the ~ituallon (among other tlungs). that attempts tu quanti!) this process 
may prove to be dIfficult at best 
6. Oynamic Air Ta~king Ordl,'r Generation 
A~ de~cnhed !II Chapter IV, EE fLM currently employs a scrtpted datafile (the 
• ORD :ile) III tnggcr aircraft and T[-",\1 smkes ~galnst land lalgets Thele bas been 
"or]... done (() gene~alC a d\ndmlC Air Ta~J...lng Ordel (:\TO) \\Ithm tht' ~tfllcture of 
EE1 L!\1 ([Ref 4}). hullt ha~ 1101 heen Incorporated imo the model to date As the mod",! 
I, transferred from a personal computer lo a more powerful [oundatlOn, thj~ capablhtj wlil 
h~ Installed 
'i:nllllaelicall\111ncu"l" 
As mentioned In Chapter V, Ih" current [F,TUd ~cenano doe\ not alter the path 
01 the nil.\al Uilits when the\ pClcelve a PQtcntiallhreat (I e, when they ,'ome within range 
oft:nenl'~ ,lIf <:oa~tal artiller, etc) 8:- employing a weighted DiJk";;tra'<; algorithm similar 
10 that emploved hy the ground forces, naval forces can. 111 theory, choose theil paths 
CVllaln1C'ull\' In respome 10 the pen;elved tlueat> Trlls mechamsm ha~ not been le,t..:d to 
dale due I(! the sp~rslly of the M,d net\\olk dnd Ihe la,'k of coa~lal defellse 'It..:~ In this 
rarllcula~ ~cenarto With a III ore dcn~e network anJ a Tllore powerful pl.llform with v"jl!ch 
10 gem'rate more complex scenanos. the application of this algollthm. once validated. will 
prcne\!Yorthwhlie 
Wahln the nodes them,elves. II is deSIrable 10 have the naval battle groups as~ume 
lac~lcdl formatlon~ lD re~ron~e to the percel\ed level ofthrcat~ from aIr, surface, or 
~u]"urfale !rlleats This charartenstlc was dlscllssed in Chapter III By pamtiomng the 
phJ~lc.l1 and IranSIt nodes, and by deflIllIlg a presel formallOn for ddendmg agalIlst each 
l',pe ufthreal Ihe na'val forces can be gl'ven a level ofleaiJsm far beyond that \\hi.;h the\ 
curl cntl\ possess The proccss of partitioning the nodes m the EETUvf architecture IS 
dlo~'u",eJ III grealer dC'tali in Rctelcncc lSI] 
8. H:JILh' [)amag(' Assc~smcnt 
ThC' Bd.l!k Damage A~sc~~mellt (BDA) algonthm descnbed in Chapter 1\' l~ 
ad.rHw,ledged to be a VCrt b,ISIC place holder for naval BO-\ More S()phl~llcated Il.lles 
'-o~ B[)-\ n.:<;t III Nhel s\''>tcm~, but \\Cfl' not mduded mtll!.', model due II' S17~ dm; 
III ruture '> e[~J()fI' ot' ECTLM Thl5 ma\ bC' accompiJshcd 1Il OIll: otl\\O fa~hlOm, ~dr; 
more 'OphlSllcated algonthm" \:l\() the C'I~lIng EFT] lI,1 arclutecturt or modlty EETI \1 so 
that II alce,~e~ E"\lstillg BOA m()del~ dunng scenano nlIl~ The lattC'r option \vould 
requllt sIFnlfi,'antl~ mure effurt and lesearch tu Implement. bUl \!Yould ldke ~dvanlage of 
c\.lstlng method, ofdetelmlnmg engagement outcome, Tmplementmg additional 
algorithms IIlto the cunen! model \'>'111 he qUlckel and eaSier to accomph~h, and could be 
effected In the near teml while future re~earch detelffimes a bener method 
C. HIESIS CO,,"CLUSIOl'tS 
One of the pll0ntleS In the development of this modd ha~ been to mcorporale as 
ofrhc jom! a~pc:cb of warfare as po:,sibk, In ordel to lefleo the changlllg donnne 
oftne l 'TIlted States mlinaT") The jOlnt aspects mcorporated do not lust include force 
packages Irom the \Jnous ser.'lces, but also the issues and requircment~ that different 
sefYlces have in telms of comhat modelmg Inputs to EETLM have been received fTOm 
\aflOu~ DOD agC:llCilC, and many llftnese reqUlrement~ ha .... e been Implemented in thi, 
Ihesl, ver~]()n of Ihe model wIth remainIng reqUIrements scheduled for mstallatwn mto 
future,erswils 
/vlOtller consIderatIOn that has been made In the development ofEETL \1 ha~ beeu 
to keep the model at a u~er-fnendly level Current versions of the model operate on!l 
de~ktop personal computer, whIle the future versIOns of the model are to operate on a 
~\orbtdl1on Tlw, u!-'grade m computmg platform~ wa, nt"ce~~ary 111 order to allow 
EE I L \1 to model more comple\ seenanos and to achlC\e greater fideht) m the model's 
algonthm~ Bm the environment m whIch EETLM WIll operate WI!! still be a Wmdows 
style envIronment ThIS is done in order to pre1,ent EETLM form becommg a tool that 
on.\' speClally named analyst., can operate, and aBo\>, for the widest di~semination of the 
model ~., po"ibk The lltiltt\' of a model that can be used h, a local theater staff. thai ha~ 
the Ilexlbdlt~ W dllo" ea,\ changes In scenallO and combat c...lpabllille, ofholh ~Idc, III d 
lon:ll~! dnri thot produce outputs that are amenable 10 stal1s\lc,11 allalysl~ IS conSldClec. tl' 
11e [jUlte lugll "I hd!!'> the kvel ofmatunty EETLM j, trymg to acllle\e 
TIllS theSIS has demoustrated the Ul!ht:v ofEETLl\l in aiding a theateJ comm.mdel 
III lhe decl~lon maklll~ process Utll!zmg the North Korean \1RC scenarIo. data trom the 
tile J' 11\ ,ll ofnJ\ ~I lorce, had upon th~ OlltCOIn!;, of a conflict Ha,cd on tile multiple 
l\10E'i "elected for tll1~ analvsls. the lesults of the modd mdlCated that the early arrl\alllf 
n;l\al r()rce~ wa, the most desilable optIOn for a commander to take. as v,.a~ expected 
The margm of des1r~biIJly fOi this option however, was not as great as 11 was thOllght II 
,IIOUld ha\t heer!. nOI \V~, It presumed to be of statIstIcal slgrut;caIllve This phenomenon 
I' JlIllbll["d [(lllle lad, 01 matUrity ofsom~ ofEETLI\-1', d.gontilms anG the lad. of 
["dUlleJI dLCUlaC\ In the DPRK :-'avy', c:ombat cdpabilltlcs A~ thc modd matUles and Ih 
opcratlllg algorithms validated, it IS belIeved that future anaj~'sl$ will prOVide a much do,er 




The daHl In tillS append!.\ defines a portion ofth" * I\r'l datd flk lIsed fO! tlw, 
A (omplete deJimtloII of the * NET data file can be found 111 Reference [5] 
I ~";I(':dln()Je., 
Phvslcal node name - 110 10 characters 
L '\.ode10 mlmber-!nlegcr 
Ldlitude Eillered In dcgree~-mlnute~-~IO.:ond~ format wnh the last d~rdctc! 
IIldlcaung the dire';l!cln "N" - north and "so, = ~outh. from the equator 
I atltucte, may range from 90S to 90N 
d L,mgllude - 2 to 10 characters Entered In degfee~-Imnule~-Sec[)nd, format 
with the last character indicJtmg the direction. "E" - 1O",t ami "\v' = ""cst, flam 
the pJlme mendlan Longitude, may lange trom 1t;(JW to ISO!: 
111 theme) tlag - G ~ No, j •• 'I eo, 
j Diameter - real m kilometer, 
L\c - I = air ba~c 
loglstlc~ base 
- Jefen~ive point 
"= ML C[(l,\lng poml 
I:> clme:operallonsaJca 
Sea-ba~ed missile launch site 
::; -- :\TSFS ime,'al1lphlbIOU~ Imc oldcparturc 
9 = l!l1den\a~ replem~hment ~tat\On 
h "lerram - U=sea 
I = open nodcfcnscs 
2 = hasty dcfen~e~ 
:; .. deliberate defenses 
4 = maJorobstac1e 
5=mban 
I C al'dLIl) - I eal Number ofunrts that can ~Imlll!a!leousli occupv the node 
J Ohstacle- u~ none 
I =mmefield 
:2 ~ not defined 
3-notdefined 
4 - chemical '.:ontammallon 
5 radluloglcal CDntamma\IOn 
6 ~ \\aterv,a, constrained by wldth(eg canal) 
7~Waterv,.dvconsTralnedb!depth 
S = Waterway constramed by depth and width 
j... Cover - real Amount of cover/concealment at node (Real [0 0, I OJ) 
I SUitable for con'.:cakd approad - ° = No 
1 -Yes 
m ~ultable for defensl,e ob,tacles - 0 - No 
Sed ~tate - Integer [U,5] 
o !\mmuIlltion supply capacit'y -real in tons 
r POL cara'.:]!, n'al in gallon, 
q Ground supp), (apdCllv - real In tom 
r Air suppl:vcapacJl\ -realmtons 
, Nllmber of sides sto-.:kpiling ~upplies to support an attack - integer ?' () 
I LOgl,:ICS buildup infollna[lOn For each ;;ide emer [he toilo\\'ing 
(11 Side name· I to 10 characters The name of a previously ddined 
(2) ","ormal numb.;;, uf logis[ic~ pa..:kages - integer 
(~) Deviation oflugl';[ics package~ - Integer (I 
(4) Normal ntlmber of combat units -mtegel 
(5) Deviation ofcomb~t units mt~ger' 0 
T~!!.!!2i; N()d~, 
SOUice node The name ofa physical node 
Destination node - The n~me of a phy~ical nude 
Number of transit nodes - integer 2: I 
1 ransi[ node lllformatiorl For each tran~it node, enter the following 
(I) Transit node name - I to 10 characters 
(:::J Di~tance - rlOailn kilometers 
(3) Road type - I = primary' 
2 ~ secondaf) 
3 - unpaved/trail 
(41 l'erralll - 0 = ,ea 
I = flat 
C; = s.:verc 
(5) Wetlalld!mal~h - 0 No_ I Ye~ 
(b) Natural obstacle - 0 = No, I - Yes 
(7) :>.1anmadeobstaclc O=No. 1 =Yes 
(R) Mountall1 - 0 = t-.o, I = Ye~ 
(q) Urban - 0 = No. I = Yes 
(10) J'raflicability - I = No restriGtion 
~ ~ Road movement onl; 
] = No heavy equipment 
4·' No wheeled vehicles 
5 = Fool only 
(II', Cil.pacit) - real. Width in kilometers across mobility corridor 
(j ~) Obstacles 0 = none 
I = minefield 
2 = requires bridging 
3 - requIres physical clearing (non-explosive) 
4 - chemIcal contammatlOll 
:; = radiological contamination 
6 = \Vaterway constrained by width (e g canal) 
7 ~ Waterway constrained by depth 
S '-- Waten."av constrained by depth and width 
(ll) CO,er real Amount of cover/concealment at !lode 
Real [0 O. j OJ 
(14 i SUitable for ambush - 0 -- No.1 - Yes 
I ! 5 i Sllttable tor obstacles· () '" No I 0 Ye, 
(16) Sea state - integer [O.SJ 
(17) Detectlon rales ror each side enter tnC" foJlowing 
(al Side name- I to IOc:haracrers 
Ib) De!ec~t rme-
(c.) Mmimum detections needed to launch Illterdicllon miSSl(lIlS 
Integer:c I 
(j S) Numbel- of deep strike attrition rate entries 
(j.2jJ Deep strike attrition rates for each entry enter the folluWlIlg 
(a) Sitle name of attacker - I w ]0 c.haracters 
(b) Side name oi'\'ICllm - I to IU charac.ter, 
(e) Aaritionralc -real 

APPENDIX B 
BLUE NAVAL COMBATANT DATA 








NATO Sea Sparrow 









F-J4, F/A-18, A-6E, E-2C, S-3A. EA-6B. SH-60F 











TOMAHAWK Land Attack MsJ 
(TLAM) 
TOMAHAWK Anti Ship Msi 
(TASM) 















3 SPRUANCE DD: 
(a) Radars 
Name Range 
SPS-40 320 km 
SPS-55 37 km 
SPQ.9 37 km 
(b) Weapons 
Name Range 
NATO Sea Sparrow 14.5 km 
HARPOON 130 km 
TOMAHAWK Land Attack Msi J300km 
(TLAM) 
TOMAHAWK Anti Ship MsJ 460 km 
(TASM) 
5 inch Guns 23 Ian 
(c) Aircraft: 
SH-60B 


























































RED NAVAL COMBATANT DATA 










HORMONE ASW Helicopter 









HEAD NET 129 kIn 
SCOOP PAIR 463 km 
(b) Weapons 
Name Range 
SAN-J 46 kIn 
SSN-3B 400 Ian 
(0) N<=ft· 
HORMONE ASW Helicopter 








HORMONE ASW Helicopter 






















HORMONE ASW Helicopter 

























APPEKDLX D. EETLM OlTPIIT FOR'lATS 
Thb appendl" hSIS portIOns ofthe output filc~ generated from lh.: EETLM dal<l 
run, spe.::ificallv repliCallOn I ofca~c R2-FI (Red punumg rOA. 2, Blue utilizing Entry 
Cd~e I) The pLilpose behind thl~ appendIx I~ to farrHilaJlze lhe redder v..lth the type and 
iormdl 01'the data produced by EEl L:\1 Tile actual data trom the runs conducted tor thiS 
rlwsis Bfe <Jvallable from Dr Sam Parry OR Department. l\aval Postgraduate School 
\l,)rltere, Callfornlii ')lC)~,-SO(l\J 
A COA.dalafiie 
A C D 
~F:A..RCHjl\(J TRACKED 
IIl\fE SIDE SIDE COA PROB 
1,2' flLlrr RED eOA I 0333333 
U :, BLUE RED COA I o ]308GI 
BLUE RED COAl 0]80638 
BLUE RED COA I 0020773 
-
BLUE RED eOA.] 034%01 
RED GLUE eOAJ 0333333 
IU'.D HLUF COA 1 U 3}3333 
f) ~~ ReD BLUe eOA 1 0736063 
I R[D BUff CO.A. , 073606; 
L~2~ ReD BUIl-_ COA' 0:::9183-i 
lable I) PonlOll oflh.: CO·\ Output I'I1c for Case R2-EI, Replilatlon I 
lUI 
Provides the scenano lime fOf ..... hlch the eOA I~ aprile-able The 
lime Interval c(]rre~ponds to the lenglh of the perceptIOn update 
De<;ignates the side generating the percepllon~ 
DeSignates the slde that perceptlOn~ afe bemg generated upon 
D Indlcate~ the C()ur~e of Action bemg c()n~ldered 
The Side 1D culUmn B's perception of the probabilitY' that the Side 1D 
column C IS following the COA mdlCdted m column D 
Example 
At time () ~. Blue's perception IS that Red i~ following eOA I \vllh a 
probabdl\Y of 0 110861 At the same time, Red's perceptIOn I, that Blue IS followmg 
COAJ with a probability of 0 33333 
IU:! 
11 I~ngagcment data file 
1 FTLMRepilc,moH I Sal Julie. 13 4'),2t( 1<)~4 
AlR ~TRn.::ES A:'ill SlIPSACE-TO-SL'RFACE ENC1AGE~1Fl\TS 
Table q Portion orlne Lngagement Output Fiic for Case R2-E1. Replication I 
.l2!umn Pu~ 
Indicates tne ~idt; initiating tht; attack 
Designate:; the mi~sion numbt;f RS, for example, indicates the fifth 
attack initiatt;d by Red Those missions marked by an asterik 
(ex, B 13·) are scripted vi(l the * ORO data ftlt; 
The tm1e Ine altack wa~ mitiated 
[) Time On Target for the attack 
Thl' targer. of the attad Tar~r:b could be ellher a d:scle[t unit. 01 
" pnysical:transit node in the case of an air to grollnd altad; 
The calt:,.;ury of largd belllg at1~eked 
G Weapon used in the aHad; 
H ,,",umber of round,,; expended in the salvo 
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Strength category Each ofthe categories utilized in Reference 
[11 J are reponed. although the;, are not all shov.f] in this appendix 
Strength of the target under the strefl!..,'1h category pnor to the 
attack 
K Strength of the target under the strengTh category after the attack 
Examples 
I \hssion package R5 was a scripted mission agamst Group :2-1 that had a TOT 
of 6 0341:, and thus commenced al 6 01827 The allack consisted Drone LW-2S() anu 
reduced Group 2-1 's ground strength from I 1861 personnel to 1185(, per~onnel 
::: Mis<;ion package R I OC} wa" an unscripted naval engagement hy Red against a 
:argct on transit node 68 (a sea node to the east of the Korean Peninsulal_ The attack 
tailed due to faulty targeting by Red, thus the not applicable entrie~ in the columns 
3 MisslOn package RIO was an unscripted naval engagement by Red against the 
L'SS NEWPORT The attack con"istcd offour SSN-J9 missilt~. and sank the 
NE\VPORT 
4 \.-1isslon package B 13 was a scripted TLM1 a!lack against a Red mrfielc!, wilh 
a designated llfne on lOp of 005 One the three shelters at the airfield were destroyed hy 
the TLA .. 'v1 attack 
'i Mission package B I S2 wa~ an unscripted naval engagement against a Red 




C LogistIcs data file 
FTLM Replication 1 Sat lui 16 13 '49:28 1994 
ESTIMATED LOGISTIC BUILDUP RATES AND ArrACK TIMES 
G H 
BUiLDUP RATES LOG ATTACK TIMES FLOAT 
UNIT 
OLD NEW COUNT OLD NEW OLD NEW 
6.66667 6,66667 2.2699 
".2 2J 6,66667 6,52174 2.0199 1.62497 
Table 10 Portion of the Logistics Output File for Case R2-EI, Replication 1 
Column ~ 
A Denotes the time that the observation is applicable to Corresponds 
to the time oftne perception update cycle designated by the user in 
the" NET data file 
The rate oflogistical buildup from the previous update 
The current rate of logistical buildup 
D The number of Red log units detected by Blue 
The perceived time for Red's attack from the previous update cycle 










G Amount of slack time (i.e., time until the deployment of naval and 
MPS forces is necessary in order for these forces to arrive in 
theater prior to Red's attack) based on previous update cycle 
H Current amount of slack time available 
Blue's intended COA based on what Blue perceives Red's ground 
truthCOAis 
D Position data file 
FTLM Replication 3 Sat Jul 16 13 59:29 1994 
UNIT POSITIONS 
NODE PERSONNEL TANK lFV 
TF.BI TRANSIT.70 
TRANSIT.71 
TF.B3 CVOA3 600 
TF.B4 CVOA2 
GROUP,I-I MUNSAN 
GROUP 1·2 WONJU 
GROUP.I-3 KANGNUNG 12000 116 300 









Table II. Portion of the Position Output File for Case R2-El, Replication 1 
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.c.clImm ~ 
A Scenario time 
B Unit Group.I-I,Group.I-2.etc .• aregroundunits TF.BI, 
TF.B2. etc., are naval units. 
C The node that the unit in column B is occupying at the time listed in 
column A 
D-I The "bean-count" ofitems the unit named in column B has at the 
time in column A 
E Strength data file 
The strength data file is divided into two pans, one for initial strength and one for 
final strength Each part of the data file consists of three distinct sections 
• Unit assets section (One for ground and one for naval units) 
• Unit strength section (One for ground and one for naval units) 
• Squadron strength section 
Examples provided in this appendix are for the initial strength ofthe naval units. 
When necessary, the significant differences between the naval unit fonnat and the 
ground unit format will be discussed. 
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A 
(1) Unit assets section 
FTLM Replication I Sat Jul16 13"49:28 1994 
Seed "" 757816775 
Odd/even flag "" 1 
INITIAL UNIT STRENGTHS 
NAY AL UNIT ASSETS 
B c o E G H 
UNIT SHIP DAMAGE PERSONNEL TANK MKlJ tdK41 RED NAVY 
LNCHR VLS LNCHR RADAR 
TF B 1 NIMITZ U 
TF.BI C'Vll.LE U 
TF B3 WASP U 200 
TF B3 WHIDBEY U 150 
Table 11 Portion of the Strength Output File for Case R2-EI, Replication I 
Unit Asset Section . 
.G2!..Y.mn ~ 
A Identifies the task force the unit is a member of 
B Identifies the individual unit by name 
C Ship's status. (U=- Undamaged, D=- Damaged, S= Sunk) 
o The number of ground force personnel (i e., Marines or Anny 
troops) embarked. EETLM uses this value as a measure of how 
potent a ground threat a ship is. 
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E The number of tanks embarked, This value is also used as a 
measure of the ship's ability to affect the ground campaign 
The number ofMk 13 missile launchers remaining. 
G The number ofMk 41 VLS launchers remaining. 
H The number of generic Red missile launchers remaining. 
The number of generic Navy search radars remaining 
Note The assets listed are for the naval units. Ground units list the following 
asset categories instead: Personnel, Tank, IFV, APC, Ground Mortars. Artillery, AD 
Radars, AD Launchers, AUack Helicopters, Engineering units, C3 units, CJ Antennae; 
POL. Ammunition, and MLRS launchers 
(2) Unit strength section 
A • C D • F G B I J 
UNIT SHIP AGG AGA AAG AAA CO2 ceo CIN CCM 
----- -----
-- - ------ - - -
TFBI NIMITZ 000 ,,~ 0.00 000 0.00 0.00 0.00 000 
TFBt CVILLE 100 3.00 0.110 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TF.BL O'BRlEN 100 300 000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TF.BI SPRUANCE 1.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TF.Bl WASP 203.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 200.00 0.00 
TF.B3 WHIDBEY 153.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 150.00 0.00 
Table 12 Ponion of the Strength Output File for Case R2-E I, Replication I 
Unit Strength Section 
~ ~ 





















B Identifies the individual unit by name. 
C-M Strength codes as defined in Reference [II] 














Table 13. Portion of the Strength Output File for Case R2-El, Replication I 
Squadron Strength Section 
!&.!J.!mn ~ 
A The name of the squadron. 
The type of aircraft in the squadron 
C The number of aircraft remaining. 
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APPENDIX E. EETI..M OUPUT DATA 
1 This appendix provides the raw data for each of the MOE's described in this thesis 
For simplicity. this appendix will be organized by the scenario run case (i.e .. RI-El, 
R I-E2, etc,) For convenvience, the MOE's are provided below (Chapter V provides 
detailed descriptions of the five MOEs): 
MOE I. Number of ships surviving at the end of the scenario 
MOE I '" # of ships at end of scenario 
# of ships at start of scenario 
MOE 2 Percent of surviving combat strength of the naval forces. 
MOE 2 '" # of combat equipment at end of scenario 
# of combat equipment at start ofscenari 
MOE) The combat strength of Blue reJative to Red 
MOE) = 
[ Blue strength at end of scenario 1 
Blue strength at start of scenario 
[ Red strength at end of scenario 1 
Red strength at start of scenario 
MOE 4: Percentofsurvivingaircraft 
MOE 4 '" # of ~ircraft at end of scenario 
it- of aircraft at stan of seenari 
MOE 5: Percent of surviving ground forces 
MOE 5 = # of ground troops at end of scenario 
# of ground troops at start of scenari 
III 
a. Rl·El 
MOE CATEGORY REP} REP2 REP] 
1 BLUECVs I I I 
BLUE CRUDES 0.5 0.5 0.5 
BLUE AMPHIBS 0.25 0.25 0.25 
REDSAGJ 10 10 1.0 
RED SAG 2 0.3333 0.3333 03333 
2 BLUECVBG 0.64 0.64 0.64 
BLUEATG 0.375 0.4167 04219 
RED NAVAL UNITS 0.76 0.76 0.76 
] BLUE CVBG # SHIPS 1.125 1.125 1.125 
BLUE CVBG EOUIP 0.8421 0.8421 0.8421 
BLUE ATG # SHIPS 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 
BLUE ATG EOUIP 0.4934 0.5482 0.5551 
• BLUE USN FIGHTER 0.9167 0.625 08333 
BLUE USN ATTACK 0.8636 0.5 0.6136 
BLUE USAF FIGHTER 0.0833 0.0 0.0 
BLUE USAF A1TACK 0.25 0.25 0.0 
REDF/GHTER 0.4167 0.4167 0.4167 
REDA1TACK 00 00 00 
5 BLUE 0.3235 0.2611 0.2611 
RED 0.2824 0.5995 0.5995 
Table 14 MOE Values for Case RI·EI 
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b RI-E2 
MOE CATEGORY REP 1 REP] REP3 
1 BLUECVs 1.0 0.5 1.0 
BLUE CRUDES 0.5 0.6 0.6 
BLUE AMPHIBS 0.5 0.25 0.375 
RED SAG 1 1.0 10 1.0 I 
i RED SAG 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
] BLUECVBG 0.64 0682 0.64 I 
I BLUEATG 0,625 0.3958 0,4653 
REDNAVAL UNITS 1.0 1.0 1.0 
i 3 BLUE CVBG # SHIPS 0.75 0.55 0.8 
BLUE CVBG EQUIP 0.64 0.682 064 
BLUE A TG # SHIPS 0,25 0.125 0.1875 
BLUE ATG EOUIP 0,625 0.3958 04653 
4 BLUE USN FIGHTER 06667 0.1667 0,6667 
BLUE USN A1TACK 0,5455 0.3182 0.5455 
BLUE USAF FIGHTER 0,0833 00 0.0833 
BLUE USAF ATTACK 0,0833 0.0 0.0833 
RED FlGHTER 05833 0,5833 0.5833 
RED A 1TA CK 01667 0.1667 0.1667 
5 BLUE 05012 0,4633 0.5012 
RED 0.2230 0.2230 0.2231 
Figure 15 MOE Values for Case RI-E2 
li3 
c Rl-EJ 
MOE CATEGORY REP} REP2 REP3 
J BLUECVs 0.5 1.0 OS 
I 
BLUE CRUDES 0.6 0.5 06 
BLUE AMPHIBS 0.625 0.25 0.625 
RED SAG I 0.25 1.0 0.25 
REDSAG2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
2 BLUECVBG 0.682 0.64 0.682 
BLUEATG 07344 0.375 0.6875 
RED NAVAL UNITS 0.6686 1.0 0.6686 
3 BLUE CVBG # SHIPS 0.88 0.75 0.88 
BLUE CVBG EQUIP 1.020 0.64 1.020 I 
I 
BLUE ATG # SHIPS 0.5 0.125 OS 
BLUE ATG EQUIP 1.098 0.375 1.028 
4 BLUE USN FIGHTER 0,1667 0.6667 01667 
BLUE USN ATTACK 0.3]82 0.8182 0.3182 
I BLUE USAF FIGHTER 0.0 00833 0,0833 
BLUE USAF ATTACK 00 00833 0,0833 
RED FIGHTER 04167 0.3333 0.4167 
I RED ATTACK 0.0 0.0 00 
5 BLUE 0.2621 0.4092 0.2989 
RED 0.4771 04159 04770 
Table 16. MOE Values for Case RI-E3 
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d R2-El 
MOE CATEGORY REP I REP] REP3 
I BLUECV.f 05 10 0.5 
BLUE CRUDES 0.6 05 0.6 I 
i BLUE AMPHIBS 0.25 0.25 0.25 
RED SAG 1 0.25 0.25 1.0 
REDSAG2 06667 1.0 0.6667 
2 BLUECVBG 0.682 0.64 0.682 
BLUEATG 03958 0.3958 0.4167 
REDNAVAL UNITS 0.8571 0.6686 0.8586 
3 BLUE CVBG # SHIPS 1.2 1.2 0.66 
BLUE CVBG EQUIP 07957 0.9573 0.7943 
BLUEATG#SHIPS 0.2727 0.2 0.15 
i BLUE A TG EQUIP 04618 0.5921 04853 
4 BLUE USN FIGHTER 0.5 0.5 0.4167 
BLUE USN A1TACK 0.4091 0.4091 0.2727 
BLUE USAF FIGHTER 0.0 0.0 00 
BLUE USAF ArrACK 0.0 00 00 
RED FlGHTER 0.5 0.5 0.5833 
REI> ATTACK 00 00 00 
5 BLUE 02995 0.2994 0.4105 
RED 0.5907 0.5908 0.5294 
Table 17. MOE Values for Case R2-El 
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e R2-E2 
MOE CATEGORY REP 1 REP] REP) 
1 BLUECVs 0.5 1.0 1.0 I 
BLUE CRUDES 06 0.5 0.5 
BLUE AMPHIBS 0.25 0.5 0.25 
RED SAG I 1.0 0.25 0.5 
REDSAG2 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 
] BLUECVBG 0.682 0.64 0.64 
BLUEATG 0.4427 0.65]0 0.4427 
RED NAVAL UNITS 0.8586 0.5271 0.6071 
) BLUE CVBG # SHIPS 0.66 1.6363 1.2857 
BLUE CVBG EOUIP 0.7943 1.2141 1.0541 
BLUEATG # SHIPS 0.15 0.5455 0.2143 
BLUE ATG EOUIP 0.5156 1.2350 0.7292 
4 BLUE USN FIGHTER 0.25 0.625 0.8333 
BLUE USN ATTACK 0.3636 0.5227 0.5455 
BLUE USAF FIGHTER 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 
BLUE USAF ATTACK 0.0833 0.0833 0.0833 
I RED FIGHTER 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 
REDA7TACK 0.25 025 0.25 
5 BLUE 0.4369 0.3349 0.4399 
RED 0.5894 0.5893 05893 
Table 18 MOE Values for Case R2-E2 
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I MOl C4TEGORY REP I ~P]J REP.? 
J RLUECV~ 05 I " LO 
I BLUECR(lIJES 06 0.5 OS 
i BLlIE AMPHIBS 025 0.25 j 0.25 ! 
i RED SAG J I 0 I 0 10 
REDSAG2 06667 0.6667 0.6667 
! 
2 BLUECVRG 0.682 0.64 0.64 
I BLUE A Te; 0.3958 04167 0.3958 
REf) NAVAL UNITS 1.0 I (18586 0.8586 I 
I 
3 I RU..'E CVEG # SHIPS 0.66 09 09 
I 
ELliE CVRG EQUIP 0.682 0745'1 074"4 
I BLUE ATG # SHIPS 0.15 o 15 (; 15 i-i RU/E ATG EQUIP 0.3958 I n 485 '\ U 46lU 
~ BLUE USN FIGHTER 0.25 fj 2083 0.75 
I I BLUEUSNATTACK 0.3636 0.2045 0.5909 
I BLUE USAF FIGHTER 0.0833 0.0 0.0833 
I BLUE USAF ATTACK 0.0833 0.0 0.0833 
REDHGHTER OS 0.5 OS 
RED ATTACK 00833 0.0833 00833 
5 Rl.UE I 0.3606 i 03598 0.3607 
,_L RED 0.5908 05909 05891 
Table 19. MOE Values for Case R2-E3 
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g, R3-El 
MOE CATEGORY REP 1 REP] REP3 I 
] BLUECV.~ 0.5 1.0 1.0 
BLUE CRUDES 06 0.5 0.5 
BLUE AMPHIBS 0.25 0.25 0.25 
RED SAG 1 1.0 10 1.0 
RED SAG 2 0.6667 0,6667 0,6667 
] BLUECVBG 0,682 0.64 0.64 
BLUEATG 0.4167 0.4427 0.3958 
RED NA VAL UNITS 0.8586 0.8586 0.8586 
3 BLUE CVBG # SHIPS 0.66 0.9 0.9 
BLUE CVBG EQUIP 0.7943 0.7454 0.7454 
BLUEATG # SHIPS 0.15 0.15 0.15 
BLUE ATG EQUIP 0.4853 0.5156 0.4610 
4 BLUE USN FIGHTER 04167 0.9167 075 
BLUE USN ATTACK 0.4545 0.8636 0.7727 
BLUE USAF FIGHTER 0.0 0,0833 0.25 
BLUE USAF ATTACK 0.1667 0.0833 0.25 
RED FlGHTER 0.5 0.5 0.5 
REDA7TACK 00 00 0.0 
I 5 BLUE 0.3873 0.3873 0.3874 
I 
RED 0,2847 0.2847 0.2847 
Table 20. MOE Values for Case RJ-El 
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,-
REP} I H(JE L1TE(,'()R'l REP] REn 
BLUl:.:n~\ os ()5 i OS 
BLCJE CRiiDE/-; 0,6 06 I 06 
! BLl.IE AMPHIIJS I () 25 02.:' ~~ 
, 
RFl) S.4(. , 10 10 10 
RED ,'A(; 2 I ' 0 I 0 06667 
BU''F:CVBG j 0682 o 6l) ('16':) 
UU..'E ATG I 03958 04"7 I o~ 
RED j\'A VAL UNns , 1.0 1 G 08586 i 
RLUE CI'R(~ # SHIPS I 05.') US) 066 
m.l'E CI'HG EQr/iP 0682 069 08~ 
RU,EAT(jIlSHIPS U 125 0125 o 15 
BU!f ATG E JUTP I () 3958 04427 05156 
ULCE [,',\'.1\' FlGIlTER , 01667 () IM7 \I 1667 
BLUE l.;.\'S ATTACK I 03182 03182 () 3182 
~ BLl)E ('SAF FIGHTER 00 00 o 1667 IJI.LE L'S4FATTACK (10 00 o IM7 
L Iwn FlGIlTER 
! o 66(,! () 6667 (J 6667 
REJ>.4T1ACK O_2~ (125 ()25 
RILE 03982 o 4()1)7 03561 
REf) () 2849 (12848 02847 
Tallie' 21 MOf \'alues for Case R3-E2 
Ilq 
I R3-E3 
i BLUE CRUDES 
L 1 __ J"-!f."cL",'E""AC'M"-PJ"fl",B"S __ ~=---i~~--C-~~_-C 
I I RElJSAG I i 
I REDSA(il I = RWECVB(; I I--""B"'I~. L""/F'-A"'''G'----+--''=--'-- ""-.02.-+='"'-1 
~_,_HLUECVB(~SH1P~,_~_~~'__~~~ 
[. I BLUE eVRG E )UJP 
I BLUE ArG # SHIPS 
BLUE ATC; E )UIP 
4 HU/E US',,,; FIGHTER 
--
I1UI£ USAF ATTACK o U833 
, , 
I RED HGHTER ',() ~ ~--; ~811 0 ~ 
:=-J~=-=~EI)A~~~-~-~~3 I O~8~~-::'~ 
; 1IU;£ I 03073 I 0 JS", I 0 iS73 I 
REI) I 021':47 _0 2847 j ..!:! ~.12-.1 --~----~~----
Table 22 MOE Values for Case RJ-E3 
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